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 Visions of future warfighting, such as Joint Vision 2020, emphasize using new 
technologies to obtain and exploit information advantages to achieve new levels of 
effectiveness in joint warfighting.  Unfortunately, our warfighting models are notoriously 
poor at capturing the effects of information on battle outcomes.  Moreover, traditional 
measures of effectiveness (MOEs) usually ignore the effects of information and decision 
making on battle outcomes.  The Department of the Navy and other DoD organizations 
have tasked RAND to create a framework for developing measures and metrics to assess 
the impact of C4ISR systems and procedures on battle outcomes.  In order to quantify the 
effects of information and decision making on battle outcomes, RAND built a 
deterministic model and hypothesized a scenario involving the search for, and destruction 
of, a time-critical target (TCT).  This thesis extends their work by making the simulation 
stochastic and exploring practical issues such as: (i) the effects of improved C4ISR 
systems and procedures on battle outcomes; (ii) which messaging and data processing 
delay reductions give the greatest improvements in kill probability; (iii) which command 
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Visions of future warfighting, such as Joint Vision 2020, emphasize using new 
technologies to obtain and exploit information advantages to achieve new levels of 
effectiveness in joint warfighting.  Unfortunately, our warfighting models are notoriously 
poor at capturing the effects of information on battle outcomes.  Moreover, traditional 
measures of effectiveness (MOEs) usually ignore the effects of information and decision 
making on battle outcomes.  To address this shortcoming, the Department of the Navy 
and other DoD organizations have tasked RAND to create a framework for developing 
measures and metrics to assess the impact of Command, Control, Communication, 
Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems and 
procedures on battle outcomes.   
In order to quantify the effects of information and decision making on battle 
outcomes, RAND hypothesized a conflict scenario and built a deterministic model based 
on it.  The conflict scenario involves a small island country facing a large hostile 
neighboring country determined to annex the island.  A vignette developed by RAND, 
based on the conflict, is selected for examination: An operation consisting of a search for 
and the destruction of a time-critical target (TCT), specifically an enemy KILO 
submarine.  A TCT is a target with a limited window of vulnerability or engagement 
opportunity, during which it must be found, identified, targeted, and engaged.  The 
measure of performance (MOP) for RAND’s TCT vignette is the effective time 
remaining to conduct the search and detection mission of the KILO submarine, and the 
measure of effectiveness (MOE) is the kill probability (Pk) of the KILO submarine. 
Three alternative operating procedures are developed to analyze the TCT vignette.  
They are, in the order of increasing network connectivity, better C4ISR and weapon 
systems, (i) Platform-Centric Warfare (PCW), (ii) Network-Centric Warfare (NCW), and 
(iii) Future Network-Centric Warfare (FCW) operations. 
This thesis extends RAND’s work by developing a stochastic simulation model 
for the TCT vignette, benchmarking it against the existing deterministic model, and 
utilizing it to explore practical issues such as: (i) the effects of improved C4ISR systems 
 xxi
and procedures on battle outcomes, specifically Pk in the TCT vignette; (ii) which 
messaging and data processing delay reductions give the greatest improvements in Pk; 
(iii) which command and control architecture provides the highest Pk. 
A. BENCHMARKING 
Six sets of inputs are supplied to both the deterministic and stochastic model, and 
the results are compared.  The developed stochastic simulation model generally produces 
consistent results with the deterministic model, i.e., low Pk (MOE) in the stochastic 
model goes with low Pk in the deterministic model, and vice versa.  Having said that, the 
mean of the stochastic outputs should not be expected to match up exactly to the 
deterministic output—this is a consequence of the nonlinear transfer function from 
RAND’s framework of measures and metrics. 
For any set of search and detection parameters, Pk rises rapidly from zero to close 
to one within a small range of effective time remaining (0 hour to some “threshold” 
value).  When the mean effective time remaining is significantly higher than the 
“threshold” value, both the deterministic and stochastic models produce consistently high 
Pks.  The deterministic and stochastic Pks start to deviate when the mean effective time 
remaining drops near, or even below the “threshold”.  In general, deterministic and 
stochastic models produce the same results only when the results are clear. 
 xxii
B. NETWORK CENTRICITY COMPARISON 
A key objective of this thesis is to assess the effects of improved C4ISR systems 
and procedures on battle outcomes.  What this translates to in the TCT vignette case 
study is, based on RAND’s framework of measures and metrics, do Future Network-
Centric systems and procedures produce higher kill probability (Pk) than Platform-
Centric or Network-Centric systems and procedures? 
A variant of Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS) is used to generate the input sets 
for comparing the three operating procedures.  The stochastic simulation results (Figure 
1) show that Future Network-Centric systems and procedures produce significantly 
higher Pks than the Platform-Centric and Network-Centric cases.  The results confirm the 
potential of RAND’s framework of measures and metrics in modeling the general effects 
of C4ISR systems and procedures on battle outcomes.  What remains to be done is the 
calibration and validation of the framework, i.e., fine-tuning the framework to achieve 






















Figure 1. Network Comparison in Kill Probability.  The Future Network-Centric 
(FCW) systems and procedures produce significantly higher Pks than the Platform-
Centric (PCW) and Network-Centric (NCW) cases. 
 xxiii
C. CRITICAL INPUT VARIABLES 
Which messaging and data processing delay reductions give the greatest 
improvements in kill probability (Pk) for RAND’s TCT vignette?  Three data mining 
models are used to determine the variables that have the greatest impact on Pk, and to 
extract any interesting patterns/relationships from the stochastic simulation data.  Data 
mining offers a strategic approach to finding useful relationships in large data sets.  All 
three data mining models arrive at the same conclusion, specifically the critical variables 
in the time-critical target vignette, Future Network-Centric system, are the Strike/UCAV 
latency, initial SSN report latency, DDG latency, and enemy submarine submerge time.  
One of the interesting patterns extracted from the simulation results is shown in Figure 2.  
As stated earlier, Strike/UCAV latency and the initial SSN report latency are critical 
variables that have a great impact on Pk.  However, what is implied in Figure 2 is a 
stronger statement, i.e., if the Strike/UCAV and initial SSN report latencies lie within the 
triangle shown, regardless of the values (within the bounds defined) of the other input 
variables, Pk ≥ 0.8. 
D. POLLING OPTIONS FOR FCW 
How should platforms be assigned to launch the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle 
(UCAV) in the Future Network-Centric system?  This is essentially a command and 
control question that addresses the way the richly-connected network is utilized to 
support combat operations.  There are three alternative polling options, and each requires 
different times for collaboration and UCAV fly out in the TCT vignette.  Analysis on the 
simulation results shows no significant differences between the three. 
 xxiv
 
Figure 2. Strike/UCAV vs. Initial SSN Report Plot.  As long as the Strike/UCAV 
and initial SSN report latencies lie within the triangle shown, regardless of the values of 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A key element of Joint Vision 2020 is "decision superiority”—translating 
information superiority into better decisions arrived at and implemented faster than an 
enemy can react.  To that end, the National Defense Research Institute (NDRI) at RAND 
has been tasked by the Assistant for Strategic Planning (N6C), Department of the Navy, 
and Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), to create a framework for 
developing measures and metrics to assess the impact of Command, Control, 
Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) 
systems and procedures on information superiority; and more importantly, battle 
outcomes.  This is a first attempt to create such a link between C4ISR systems and 
procedures and battle outcomes for the Navy. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The primary objective of RAND’s work is to create a framework for developing 
measures and metrics that adequately assess the impact of improved (or degraded) C4ISR 
systems and procedures on battle outcomes.  In the process, example measures and 
metrics are suggested that purport to achieve this goal.  These are presented with the idea 
of generating dialog in the Naval and C4ISR communities concerning the framework and 
the measures and metrics suggested. 
Although measures are simply bases or standards of comparison, and can 
therefore, be described qualitatively, metrics must be mathematical expressions that allow 
us to evaluate, not only the relative effect of alternative C4ISR systems on battle 
outcomes, but also the degree to which one is better or worse than another.  This argues 
for strict mathematical formulations that produce the expected results.  It is important to 
note however, that the process suggested by RAND is deductive; i.e., none of the 
equations are based on experimental or operational data.  Validation remains an essential 
task for future work. 
Traditional measures of effectiveness (MOEs) usually ignore the effects of 
information and decision-making on battle outcomes (Reference 1).  C4ISR operations 
1 
have been analyzed separately, and their effects on battle outcomes have usually been 
inferred rather than directly assessed.  For RAND’s study, an important part of their work 
is to create an appropriate naval warfare scenario, whereby the effects of information and 
decision making on battle outcomes can be quantified. 
The conflict scenario hypothesized involves a small island country facing a large 
hostile neighboring country determined to annex the island.  The conflict is set 10 years 
into the future to provide time to implement emerging C4ISR systems and procedures, as 
well as emerging Navy systems.  The fact that the primary attack routes are over water 
implies a significant naval component.  The U.S. role in the conflict is to enhance the 
island’s defensive capabilities against enemy missile attacks by attacking enemy 
launchers and intercepting their missiles in flight.  There is no desire for the U.S. to 
attack the enemy’s territory.  Two carrier battle groups (CVBGs) are dispatched, one to 
the north, and another to the south end of the island.  Cruisers working in pairs are 
assigned to ballistic missile defense duty off the island’s two major ports, and nuclear 
submarines (SSNs) are assigned to attack enemy interdiction submarines.  One of 
RAND’s vignettes based on the conflict scenario is selected for detailed study: An 
operation consisting of a search for and the destruction of a time-critical target (TCT). 
A TCT is a target with a limited window of vulnerability or engagement 
opportunity, during which it must be found, identified, targeted, and engaged.  The focus 
of the TCT analysis is on the development of mathematical relationships that link 
Network-Centric operations, command and control, combat operations, and battle 
outcomes.  The first two focuses on the measure of performance (MOP), effective time 
on target, and the latter two focuses on the MOE, kill probability.  In developing the 
combined metric: 
a. Graph theory is used to assess the network connectivity, i.e., determine the 
number of nodes and connections in the command, control and 
communications network supporting the mission.  More nodes in the TCT 
network may lead to the positive effects of collaboration, or the negative 
effects of complexity.  Collaboration enhances the degree of shared 
awareness in the network, whereas complexity is the result of too much 
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information being made available to the Task Force nodes resulting in 
what is generally referred to as “information overload”. 
b. Information theory is used to quantify the degree of knowledge present 
and how it affects kill probabilities. 
c. Search theory is used to determine the detection probability of the TCT. 
RAND suggests a three-step exploratory data analysis method for evaluating the 
MOP and MOE from the TCT vignette: 
a. Phase 1 – An introductory visual exploration: This allows all inputs to 
occur with equal probability. 
b. Phase 2 – A focused analysis: The objective is to restrict the exploration 
to ranges of input variables that are more likely to occur. 
c. Phase 3 – A full-scale stochastic simulation: The simulation does not 
use the expected values of known distributions, but randomly draws from 
the distributions at each simulation iteration. 
Exploratory data analysis (EDA) is an approach developed by John Tukey (1977).  
EDA takes an open-minded, exploratory attitude towards data, employing graphical 
techniques to find useful relationships and patterns within the data.  EDA differs from 
traditional analysis in the way the model is used.  In exploratory analysis, the model is 
run many times with varying input levels, as opposed to the traditional approach of 
running the best-estimate case followed by sensitivity analysis.   
The RAND EDA tool is implemented in an Excel spreadsheet.  The spreadsheet 
model enables the analyst to generate hundreds of alternatives based on varying operating 
procedures.  Prior to this thesis, RAND’s EDA tool supported only Phases 1 and 2 of the 
EDA process.   
B. OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the effects of improved C4ISR systems and 
procedures on battle outcomes, using stochastic simulation (Phase 3 of the EDA process).  
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To do this, the RAND EDA tool is extended to include stochastic simulation capabilities, 
and the TCT vignette is used as a case study for the assessment.  
The stochastic simulation model developed is then used to answer three questions 
that RAND and their Navy sponsors are interested in: 
a. Does improved C4ISR systems and procedures produce a quantifiable 
improvement in the battle outcome, i.e., does kill probability increase in 
the TCT vignette? 
b. Which are the critical processing and messaging delay times that impact 
kill probability the most? 
c. How should platforms be assigned to launch the UCAV in the Future 
Network-Centric system? 
With the new stochastic simulation portion of the EDA tool, three important areas 
of concern that could not be addressed previously now can be: 
a. Real-world outcomes—Each input and MOE should belong to a finite set 
of possible real-world outcomes, e.g., we either manage to kill the target 
or we do not.  That is, we do not kill fractional targets as is done in 
deterministic models. 
b. Variability—The current EDA tool uses expected values for the stochastic 
input variables, which produces a single output for the effective time on 
target (MOP) and kill probability (MOE).  The use of expected values for 
the stochastic input variables, instead of their true distribution will often 
generate biased outcomes, which might lead to poor decision-making.   
c. Extreme values analysis—In an analysis, extreme outcomes often provide 
answers to our questions.  For example, what causes a failure?  Are there 
simple but effective ways to push the marginal failure cases into the pass 
region?  This analysis is sometimes impossible using expected values.  
4 
C. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
Chapter I introduces the thesis, it provides the background of the thesis and the 
work done so far by RAND.  The objective and scope of the thesis are clearly indicated in 
the chapter.  In Chapter II, the TCT vignette hypothesized for the analysis is fully 
described.  The basic theories behind the formulas used in the development of 
mathematical relationships that link Network-Centric operations, command and control, 
combat operations, and battle outcomes are provided.  Chapter III focuses on the 
developmental process of the simulation portion of RAND’s EDA tool.  The formulas 
implemented in the Excel spreadsheet are documented and explained.  The simulation 
portion of RAND’s EDA tool is benchmarked against the deterministic portion.  In 
Chapter IV, the EDA results/findings from the stochastic simulation are discussed.  The 
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II. TCT VIGNETTE AND FORMULAS OVERVIEW 
Part of RAND’s study to quantify the effects of information and decision making 
on battle outcomes was to create an appropriate naval warfare scenario.  The description 
of the conflict scenario and the vignette chosen for detailed analysis constitutes the first 
half of this chapter.  The second half of the chapter lays down the theories behind the 
formulas used in developing the mathematical relationships between C4ISR systems and 
procedures, and battle outcomes. Most of the materials presented in this chapter are 
extracted from the RAND study report (Reference 1). 
A. TCT VIGNETTE 
The conflict scenario hypothesized involves a small island country facing a large 
hostile neighboring country determined to annex the island.  A vignette developed by 
RAND, based on the conflict, is selected for examination: An operation consisting of a 
search for, and the destruction of a time-critical target (TCT).  This thesis focuses on the 
TCT vignette, particularly the development of mathematical relationships that link 
Network-Centric operations, command and control, combat operations, and battle 
outcomes.  
A TCT is a target with a limited window of vulnerability or engagement 
opportunity, during which it must be found, identified, targeted, and engaged.  RAND’s 
TCT vignette (Reference 1) starts on day D+6, with a U.S. Virginia class nuclear 
submarine (SSN) beginning a previously planned Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) mission off the enemy’s coast.  On D+10, the ISR SSN detects an 
enemy KILO submarine leaving port, and it starts tracking the KILO.  The U.S. plan is to 
kill the KILO on the surface as it emerges from the port without revealing the ISR 
submarine or disrupting its mission.  A surfaced submarine is highly vulnerable.  
Submerging increases the difficulty of detecting, classifying, localizing, and killing it.  
When the SSN report gets through the network, an F/A-18 fighter attack aircraft is 
vectored to the KILO and will try to kill it using a SLAM-ER (Stand-Off Land Attack 
Missile – Extended Response) missile.  
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Three alternative operating procedures are developed to analyze this problem.  
They are, in the order of increasing network connectivity, better C4ISR and weapon 
systems, (i) Platform-Centric Warfare (PCW), (ii) Network-Centric Warfare (NCW), and 
(iii) Future Network-Centric Warfare (FCW) operations.   
In the Platform-Centric case (Figure 3), the ISR SSN will report up the chain of 
command to the Submarine Group (SubGroup) commander, who will then alert the 
CVBGs that a threat submarine has left port.  A previously designated F/A-18 on one of 
the two carriers, CV and nuclear CV (CVN) flies out to attack the KILO from outside of 
the enemy’s surface-to-air missile (SAM) envelope using a SLAM-ER missile.  The ISR 
SSN will continue to provide updates on the KILO’s position, course and speed (PCS).  
Command and control in this Platform-Centric case is split awkwardly between the SSN 
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Figure 3. Platform-Centric Operations.  The key disadvantage with the Platform-
Centric case is the long messaging delays between the ISR submarine and the F/A-18. 
In the Network-Centric case (Figure 4), the connectivity among the participants is 
richer.  The ISR SSN has two-way communications to the carriers and the deploying 
aircraft.  This removes the delay time for the SubGroup to relay messages.  The F/A-18 
receives periodic target updates directly from the ISR submarine.  The command and 
8 
control architecture has the same division as the Platform-Centric case, i.e., the F/A-18 is 
still under the command and control of the CVBG, and the ISR SSN still reports to the 
SubGroup commander, however, with the direct communication link between the ISR 
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Figure 4. Network-Centric Operations.  With a direct communication link between 
the ISR SSN and the F/A-18, the messaging delay time can be reduced. 
In the Future Network-Centric case (Figure 5), an Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle 
(UCAV) replaces the F/A-18.  UCAVs are designed to be launched from a variety of 
surface combatants.  When the ISR submarine detects the KILO, it alerts all potential 
UCAV launch ships.  Command and control procedural questions that need to be 
addressed include: Who determines which combatants are candidates to launch the 
UCAVs?  Who makes the final selection of which ship to launch the UCAV, etc? The 
ships receiving the message negotiate to determine which can get a UCAV to the KILO 
first.  A UCAV is then launched and begins its flyout to the KILO area of uncertainty 








VA-class SSN sends text message to 
SubGroup and USN ships in theater -
latency driven by security concerns. 
CV
Ships negotiate to 
determine which can get 
UCAV to Kilo first
UCAV launched and 
begins flyout










Figure 5. Future Network-Centric Operations.  Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle 
(UCAV) replaces the F/A-18. 
B. FORMULAS OVERVIEW  
The measure of performance (MOP) is the expected amount of time the F/A-18 or 
UCAV will have to detect, acquire and destroy the target.  The measure of effectiveness 
(MOE) is the probability that the weapon will kill the target given the amount of time to 
search and acquire it.  The derivation of the formulas used to determine the MOP and 
MOE constitutes the rest of this chapter.   
1. Graph Theory 
We begin by describing the command, control and communications network 
supporting the operation as an abstraction of an undirected graph.  Consider a notional 
network that consists of n nodes, with m connections.1  Of the n nodes in the network, 
however, only  are involved in the current operation.  For example, Figure 6 illustrates 
a network with 10 nodes but only 13 connections.  The shaded nodes represent those 
τ
                                                 
1 By connection we mean that the “connected” nodes are able to communicate to each other directly.  
This does not necessarily mean that there is a physical connection between the two, only that a 
communication channel exists.  Whether it is a direct link or a relayed link is immaterial. 
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involved in the operation.  This is typically the structure of operational networks.  Not all 
potential operational elements are connected and not all are involved in the current 
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Figure 6. Notional Operating Network.  The maximum number of connections in 















 nnn        (1) 
Thus ( )
2
1−≤ nnm .  In Figure 6, we have a maximum of 45 possible connections.  
If all were connected, the graph representing the network would be complete.   
Secondly, it is important to analyze the role of connected facilities not directly 
involved in the operation.  For example, nodes 6 and 10 are connected to node 9.  If node 
9 were the Commander of the U.S. Joint Task Force (CJTF) controlling the operation, 
then 6 and 10 might be information sources (fusion centers on board or remotely located, 
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national intelligence centers, etc.) available to the CJTF.  These connections allow the 
participants to collaborate in arriving at a decision.  Collaboration in this case may 
improve the quality (accuracy, timeliness, and completeness) of the decision and is 
therefore, an attribute of the command, control and communications process that needs to 
be factored into the overall metric.  On the other hand, there is always a possibility that 
too much information is made available to the Task Force nodes resulting in what is 
generally referred to as “information overload”.  This is the complexity effect and it has 
the opposite effect of collaboration. 
2. A Probability Model of Knowledge 
The uncertainties addressed in this thesis in the TCT problem center on the time 
required getting ordnance on target.  The intermediate times used to collect, process, and 
disseminate information, all of which are also uncertain, contribute to this time.  Because 
they are uncertain, all are considered to be random variables.  The most common 
distribution assumed for the intermediate times is the exponential2 distribution.  Let’s 
consider the time, t, required to complete one of the tasks in the TCT problem, where t is 
an exponential random variable with density function: 
( ) 0for  : ≥λ=λ λ− tetf t     (2) 
The expected time required to complete the task is 1 .  The uncertainty in this 
and the other times comprising the overall TCT problem can be taken to reflect a lack of 
knowledge.  Knowing exactly how long each task takes facilitates planning and 
execution, a lack of knowledge can result in poor planning and possibly, mission failure.   
λ/
3. Information Entropy 
To assess the degree of knowledge present in the density functions used in the 
TCT problem, we employ the concept of information or Shannon entropy.  Information 
entropy is a measure of the average amount of information in a probability distribution 
and is defined as: 
                                                 
2The only other distribution assumed for the intermediate times is the gamma distribution, for the 
initial SSN report delay.  Only the exponential distribution is discussed in this section.  The same formulas 
apply to the gamma case, with details provided in the simulation development chapter. 
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( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )dttftftftH
t∫∞−∞=−=Ε−= ln)(ln    (3) 
Information entropy is the negative expected value of the logarithm of the 
probability density function.  Information entropy is based on the notion that the amount 
of information in the occurrence of an event is inversely proportional to the likelihood 
that the event will occur.   
Applying the formula to the exponential distribution, we get: 


















Note that entropy varies with the variance of the distribution, as should be 
expected.  As the variance 1  increases,  also increases.  Note that entropy is 
unbounded for this distribution.3   
2/ λ ( )tH
RAND uses the entropy function to develop a measure of knowledge by first 
assessing the “certainty” in the density function.  This requires an approximate upper 
bound be assigned to , the equivalent to assigning a maximum expected time to 
complete a given task.  This should not be too difficult to do for most tasks associated 
with the TCT problem.  If we let 
( )tH
minλ  represents the minimum rate that corresponds to 














lnlnln eetK     (5) 
Note that this quantity is dimensionless and therefore, can be used directly to 
influence combat measures of effectiveness.  It is desirable however, for the measure of 
knowledge to be normalized.  This can be accomplished by noting that when minλ=λ , 
 and when ( ) ( ) 01ln ==tK ( ) ( ) 1ln ,/ min ===λ etKeλ .  Using this logic, RAND uses 
the following definition for knowledge: 
                                                 
3 This is true for all continuous distributions. 
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etK    (6) 
One problem with this formulation is the condition for “perfect” knowledge.  This 
occurs when , or when the expected time to complete a task, 1 , is 
approximately one-third the maximum expected time to complete the task.  Figure 7 
illustrates the knowledge function for 
( ) 1=tK λ/
5.0min =λ  completions per hour or a maximum 
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Figure 7. Knowledge Function for Exponential Distribution.  minλ  represents the 
minimum rate that corresponds to the maximum expected time to complete a task. 
It may be desirable in some cases to employ more stringent conditions on 
“perfect” knowledge.  This can be done by casting the probability distribution in terms of 
: eM >

























tK   (7) 
                                                 
4 For additional information on the use of information entropy as a measure of knowledge, see W. 
Perry and J. Moffat, “Measuring the Effects of Knowledge in Military Campaigns”, in “The Journal of the 
Operational Research Society”, (1997) 48, No. 10, pp 965-972. 
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4. Latencies 
For each of the three cases (Platform-Centric, Network-Centric, and Future 
Network-Centric) studied, the time required to perform the required tasks is central to 
computing the latency MOP necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of the TCT 
operations.  Table 1 lists the expected (mean) times/latencies required, as assessed by 
Navy personnel (see RAND’s report, Reference 1), to complete the tasks listed along 
with a reasonable upper bound (the lower bound is, of course, zero).   
Platform-Centric Network-Centric Future Network- 
Centric Tasks 
Mean Maximum Mean Maximum Mean Maximum 
ISR SSN alert 15 60 15 60 15 60 
SubGroup processing 20 45 20 45 20 45 
CV reads, processes, 
alerts flight operations 10 20 5 10 - - 
CV directs aircraft 2 5 - - - - 
Select launch 
platform - - - - 2 5 
Aircraft preparation 
and launch 
5 10 5 10 - - 
UCAV launch - - - - 5 10 
UCAV fly out - - - - 5 10 
F/A-18 fly out 15 30 15 30 - - 
SLAM-ER fly out 15 20 15 20 15 20 
SSN update 15 60 15 60 - - 
All times in minutes 
Table 1. Expected and Maximum Latencies for the Three Networks. 
Although not the complete story, the time required to get a weapon on target is an 
important part of the time-on-target metric.  In general, there are  nodes involved in 
the operation.  We will refer to these nodes as the Task Force.  Not all nodes need to be 
combat elements; some may be sensors, information processing facilities, etc.  The only 
criterion is that they be directly involved in the mission.  The time required for each to 
perform its assigned tasks contributes directly to latency.  Note that we are not concerned 
about “how well” they perform their task at this point, just how long it takes.  It is also 
n≤τ
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possible that the elements of the Task Force perform their tasks in parallel, sequentially 
or some combination of both.   
For node i, the time, t, required to perform all of its tasks in support of the 
operation is taken to be an exponential random variable: 
( ) tii ietf λ−λ=λ:      (8) 
where: 
iλ
1  is the mean time to complete all tasks at node i.  Assuming that all nodes act 





L       (9) 
Other operating concepts are possible.  For example, Figure 8 depicts two 
different concepts, both of which have sequential and parallel processing components.  



















  (10) 
Note that only the path nodes are assessed, not the transit time between the nodes.  
The reason is that we are assessing the delay at the nodes only: the communication time 
between nodes is taken to be practically instantaneous. 
In either case, the critical path times constitute the expected latency.  If we let 























Figure 8. Alternative Operating Concepts.  Only the latencies of those nodes on the 
critical path constitute the expected latency. 
5. Quality 
In RAND’s example, there are several ways the quality of the information 
regarding the location of the enemy submarine may be influenced by the command, 
control and communications system.  First, the equipment and procedures in place at each 
of the nodes that contribute to the operation affect the accuracy of the intermediate 
products produced at that node.  For example, the fusion facilities on board the cueing 
system determine, in part, how well the enemy submarine is tracked.  Secondly, the 
degree to which the Task Force is able to collaborate to inform decisions increases the 
confidence that a correct (accurate) decision is taken.  Thirdly, the ability of the Task 
Force to access other nodes in the network to complete the operational picture helps 
ensure nothing is missed.  Finally, the amount of training and level of experience of the 
crews and the length of time they have operated as a team affects the speed with which 
they are able to accomplish their assigned task—to locate and engage the enemy 
submarine. 
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A suitable measure of quality in the TCT problem is therefore, the amount of 
knowledge available about the expected times required to complete the tasks.  The quality 
of the processes and equipment in place at each node, i, in the Task Force is calculated as 
the knowledge function, and therefore, RAND uses a metric, .  A value of 
 close to 1.0 implies high quality whereas one nearer to zero implies low quality.  
In addition to the nodes in the Task Force, RAND assumes that the quality of the 
products produced by other nodes in the network can also be measured in the same way.   
( ) 10 ≤≤ tKi
( )tK i
6. Collaboration 
Collaboration is a process in which a team of individuals work together to achieve 
a common goal.  It is important because collaboration enhances the degree of shared 
awareness in the group focused on solving a specific problem or arriving at an agreed 
decision.  There are several reasons why collaboration might be expected to improve the 
degree of shared awareness, including the potential for increased sharing of information 
and experience, as well as synergy of inference.  However, there are other factors that can 
degrade performance, such as disruptive interactions, misunderstandings or over-valuing 
a particular point of view due to the persuasiveness or authoritarian role of an individual 
team member.  For this reason, the opportunity to collaborate can both add to and detract 
from effective combat operations.  This section treats the contributions only.  The 
detractions5 are addressed later 
We now assess the contribution of collaboration to the task of locating and 
engaging the enemy submarine.  But first, we need the definition of the degree of a node 
(or vertex) from graph theory: 
Degree:  The degree of a node or vertex in an undirected graph is the number of 
edges emanating from it, with loops counted twice.6   
The network graphs in Figure 6 and Figure 8 are undirected graphs in that the 
hat node 6 in Figure 6, for example, has degree 5. connection is two-way.  Note t                                                 
5 For a fuller discussion of collaboration and shared awareness, see W. Perry, D. Signori and J. Boon, 
“Exploring Information Superiority: A Methodology for Measuring the Quality of Information and its 
Impact on Shared Awareness”, RAND DRR-2389-OSD, 2001. 
6 Taken from B. Jackson and D. Thoro, “Applied Combinatorics with Problem Solving”, Addison-
Wesley, 1990. 
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The opportunity for collaboration depends upon the number of Task Force and 
other nodes each Task Force node is connected to, or the degree of the node.  Letting  
be the degree of node i, then the contribution of collaboration to the quality of node i’s 
operation is expressed by RAND, as the product: 
in
( )( jinj j tK ω=∏ −1 1 )
]




        ForceTask  in the is  node if 0.1




If the quality of the interaction between nodes i and j is “good”, i.e.,  is 
close to 1, then 1  will be small—thus reducing the overall product.  RAND uses 
this effect to define the expected latency accounting for collaboration as: 
( )tK j
( )tK j−
( ) ( )( )[∑ ∏τ= = ω λ−= 1 1 11i inj ji jtKcL     (13) 
The effect of collaboration is to reduce the expected time required to complete the 
mission and “good” collaboration reduces it further.   
7. Complexity 
A well-connected network is necessary for effective command and control, but it 
is not sufficient.  For this reason, RAND refers to the network as the potential energy in a 
command and control system.  The sufficient condition that must be added is the 
command and control process that operates over the network.  This is the kinetic energy 
of the command and control system and to be effective, it must produce quality 
information that is reflected in good combat outcomes; it is always possible to misuse a 
well-connected network and to effectively use one that is not well connected. 
In a well-connected network there is always the possibility that too much 
information is made available to the Task Force nodes resulting in what is generally 
referred to as “information overload.”  This can have the opposite effect of collaboration.  
Instead of speeding the time required to complete tasks, it can slow the time as staff and 
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commanders sift through the information for what is required.  RAND refers to this effect 
as complexity, and asserts that every command and control system exhibit this effect to 
some degree.   
Complexity is defined by RAND as a function of the total number of connections 
to the Task Force nodes, or the total degree of the operation.  Therefore, complexity 
focuses on the potential misuse of the network, whereas collaboration focuses on the 
effective use of the network.  Letting C represent operational complexity, then  
∑ρ== 1i inC       (14) 
For small values of C, the complexity effect is negligible and for some range it 
increases rapidly, leveling off at what might be referred to as the information overload 
point, i.e., when the information arriving from the multiple connections is so great as to 
practically shut down operations.  This suggests a logistic or S-curve relation between C 






+= 1      (15) 
The parameters a and b determine both the region of minimal impact and the size 
of the region of rapidly increasing impact.  Figure 9 illustrates a typical complexity 
function for the zero to 45 possible connections for the network depicted in Figure 6. 
                                                 
7 This curve is sometimes referred to as the logistics response function or the growth curve.  See J. 

























Figure 9. Complexity Factor.  The parameters a (-7) and b (0.3) determine both the 
region of minimal impact and the size of the region of rapidly increasing impact. 
Including complexity in the calculation of the expected latency, yields: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]∑ ∏τ= = ω λ−−= 1 1 111 1, i inj ji jtKCgCcL    (16) 
When the number of connections is low, the complexity effect on latency is 
minimal.  Between approximately 15 and 35 connections, the complexity effect rises 
sharply, leveling off to nearly paralysis at 45 connections. 
Equation (16) reflects the balance between the positive effects of collaboration 
and the negative effects of complexity.  If the effects of complexity are negligible, i.e., 
there are few connections in the network, and the effects of collaboration are 
considerable, i.e., the knowledge function for most distributions is high, then it is possible 
for the expected latency to be much lower than the sum of the critical path latencies.  
What this means is that the positive effects of collaboration have compensated for the 
time required to perform all operational tasks.  The converse is also true in a richly 
connected network where the knowledge functions are rather small.  That is, the effective 
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latency can exceed the critical path latency.  For this reason,  is called the 
“effective expected latency”. 
( CcL , )
)
                                                
8. Detection and Target Acquisition 
The measure of TCT effectiveness is the probability that the target can be 
attacked during the window of opportunity.  For the case of the surfaced threat 
submarine, it is the probability that the aircraft can detect, classify, and place ordnance on 
the submarine before it submerges.  This probability of detection depends upon time on 
target, the quality (accuracy, timeliness and frequency) of the location and speed 
estimates of the enemy submarine, and the characteristics of the attack weapon.  For the 
purpose of illustration, it is assumed that the aircraft will attack using a missile with an 
electro-optical system capable of detecting and classifying the threat submarine on the 
surface.  The aircraft is not expected to detect the submarine directly.  Instead, the pilot 
uses the cockpit display from the missile to detect and classify the target.  The pilot then 
locks the missile onto the target submarine.  For simplicity, the aircraft is assumed as 
searching the KILO area of uncertainty (AOU), with the missile employed as a remote 
sensor.  RAND also assumes a sea-skimming missile with an accordingly short 
acquisition range, and that once the missile has acquired the submarine it will be killed 
quickly.  In other words, the time of flight over the acquisition range and weapon 
reliability is not considered. 
If S is the time that elapsed between the moment the submarine leaves port and 
submerges (in hours), then T .  If T , the aircraft fails to engage the 
target.  If T , the cumulative probability that the aircraft detects and acquires8 the 
target depends upon the length of time it has to search the AOU.   
( CcLS ,−= 0≤
0>
 
8 For purposes of this analysis, we are concerned with both detection and acquisition.  However, for 
ease of exposition, we refer to both as simply “detection”. 
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Letting s denote the sweep width in nautical miles, v denote missile speed in 
knots, and A the AOU in square nautical miles, the probability of detection 9 as a 
function of search time T is: 
( )TPd
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Figure 10. Search Operations.  The actual shape of the area of uncertainty (AOU) 
depends upon what the friendly force knows about the enemy submarine’s mission. 
As depicted in Figure 10, A is taken to be the area of a circular region. However, 
the actual shape of the region depends upon what the friendly force knows about the 
enemy submarine’s mission.  The effect of knowledge is to reduce the size of the AOU 
by restricting the search to a fraction of the circle coincident with the direction of the 
submarine, which has the same effect as reducing the radius of search. 
                                                 
9 See B. Koopman, “Search and Screening: General Principles with Historical Applications”, 
Pergamon Press, Inc., 1980. 
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The radius of the AOU depends upon the elapsed time, t , since the last update 


















 ≤ 1 is the fraction of the circle that must be searched based on the prior 
knowledge of the submarine’s route of advance.  For simplicity, AOU growth is not 
considered during the search.  Similarly, the possibility of updating target data during the 
search is not addressed.  Now, the cumulative detection probability function becomes: 







−=     (18) 
Although the friendly commander has no control over target speed w, improved 
equipment and procedures can greatly affect s, v, T, and intelligence information can 
affect k.   
Figure 11 illustrates the increase in detection probability for two cases: (i) when 
the AOU is 20 square nautical miles and (ii) when the AOU is only 1 square nautical 
mile.  In both cases, the speed of the missile is 450 knots and the sweep width is 0.25 
nautical miles.  If we assume that the speed of the target submarine is constant (or in any 
case not under the friendly commander’s control), and then the radius of the AOU is 
dependent on solely the time elapsed since the last update on the target submarine’s 
location.  Note the dramatic difference in the results.  For the 1 square nautical mile case, 
detection probability “approaches one” within two or three minutes of searching whereas 
the detection probability for the 20 square nautical mile case has still not peaked after 30 
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Figure 11. AOU Effects on Detection Probability.  Note the dramatic difference in 
the results.  For the 1 square nautical mile case, detection probability “approaches one” 
within two or three minutes of searching, whereas the detection probability for the 20 
square nautical mile case has still not peaked after 30 minutes of searching. 
The probability, , is the probability that the target will be detected by time 
T.  This is the cumulative probability distribution for the probability density function: 
( )TPd
( ) Td eTf γ−γ=     (19) 







.  This is the expected time required to 
detect the target.  As with the times required to collect, process, and disseminate 
information, a maximum expected time can be determined and therefore, the knowledge 
resident in the detection time density  is assessed by RAND to be: 
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eTK    (20) 
This can be used to reflect the quality of the target location estimate, and it will 
influence the probability of detection.  
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In general, if K(T) is large, i.e., the uncertainty of the search time is small, we 
would expect a search more effectively matched to the time available, which has the 
effect of reducing the search area. The effective search area EA is:  





TKE uA π      (21) 
Applying this to the detection probability equation, the adjusted detection 
probability is: 







−=     (22) 
If we let  be the knowledge-enhanced probability of kill, then in the case 
where detection is equivalent to a kill with probability one, . 
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III. SIMULATION DEVELOPMENT AND BENCHMARKING  
The first section of this chapter documents the developmental steps to implement 
the stochastic simulation model.  In the second section, the conclusions from the 
benchmarking exercise of the stochastic simulation model against the existing 
deterministic model are discussed. 
A. SIMULATION DEVELOPMENT 
The RAND EDA tool, which was a purely deterministic model, is extended to 
include stochastic simulation capabilities, with the TCT vignette used as a case study.  
The stochastic simulation tackles three issues that could not be addressed using a 
deterministic model: real-world outcomes, variability, and extreme values analysis. 
The main developmental steps in implementing the simulation model are: 
a. Determine the appropriate distributions to represent the various latencies 
and the search and detection variables, e.g., sweep width of the SLAM-ER 
missile depends on factors like the weather conditions.  Thus, sweep width 
has a certain minimum and maximum value, and a value for a “typical 
weather” day.  The beta distribution with parameters minimum, maximum 
and mode are used to fit the sweep width variable. 
b. Design and develop a data entry form to elicit parameters of the various 
latencies and search and detection distributions.  Data validation checks 
are incorporated in the data entry form to make it user-friendly, i.e., the 
simulation model automatically checks that the data that the user has 
entered are logical, e.g., minimum ≤ average. 
c. Implement a process for utilizing the stochastic simulation to analyze the 
TCT vignette.  Adopting the framework of measures and metrics created 
by RAND, compute the effective time remaining (MOP) and kill 
probability (MOE) for each simulation replication.  The simulation is 
repeated for a user-specified number of times, and the user-specified 
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confidence intervals of the MOP and MOE are calculated from the 
simulation results, and the MOP and MOE histograms are drawn. 
The details of the simulation development are documented in Appendix A. 
B. BENCHMARKING AGAINST DETERMINISTIC MODEL 
In this section, the stochastic simulation model developed is benchmarked against 
the deterministic model.  Six pairs (stochastic vs. deterministic) of results are compared 
to provide some assurance that the stochastic model produces logical and consistent 
results with the deterministic model: 
a. Pair 1: Network centricity is set to Future Network-Centric.  All inputs are 
deterministically set to their average values. 
b. Pair 2: Network centricity is set to Network-Centric.  All inputs are 
deterministically set to their average values. 
c. Pair 3: Network centricity is set to Platform-Centric.  All inputs are 
deterministically set to their average values.  The first three pairs (second 
pair uses the same inputs as the first pair except the network centricity is 
changed to Network-Centric, and the third pair is for Platform-Centric) of 
results are based on the same inputs so that the performance of each 
network centricity can be gauged. 
d. Pair 4-Pair 6: Network centricity and inputs are set randomly, in an effort 
to add credibility to the benchmarking exercise. 
1. Pair 1 Comparison (FCW) 
The deterministic inputs for the first pair of results: 
a. Future Network-Centric (same as the Futuristic Network in Figure 10). 
b. All input parameters to the deterministic model are set at their average 
values, i.e., the mid slider bar positions (see Figure 12), except for 
submerge time and UCAV.  These two inputs are set at values that ensure 
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non-zero outputs (to make sure useful insights can be gained from the 
comparisons). 
 
Figure 12. RAND EDA Tool for TCT Vignette.  The left portion of the screen shows 
the input variables, and the right portion shows the effective time remaining and kill 
probability output surfaces. 
Note that the output surfaces for the effective time remaining and kill probability 
have 441 (21×21) outputs.  All 441 results have their network centricity set to Future 
Network-Centric, the submerge time set to 2 hours, etc.  What differentiate them are the 
values of the initial SSN report delay and the mean CV processing delay.  The initial SSN 
report delay is varied from zero to two hours in steps of 0.1 hour (21 values), and the 
mean CV processing delay is varied from zero to one hour in steps of 0.05 hour (21 
values).   
The only result from the 441 cases that are used in the deterministic/stochastic 
comparison is that with initial SSN report delay of one hour (midpoint of zero and two 
hours), and the mean CV processing delay of 0.5 hours (midpoint of zero and one hour).   
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The required result shown below is extracted from the data used to construct the 
effective time remaining and Pk output surfaces: 
Effective time remaining = 1.72 hours 



















Network NA NA 
Number of 
Runs NA NA 1000 NA NA 
Submerge 








Penalty 0.5 Constant 
0.5 
(constant) NA NA 
Initial SSN 1 hr Gamma 0 min  (min) 
60 mins 
(mean) NA 
CV 0.5 hr Exponential 30 mins (mean) NA NA 
SubGroup 0.5 hr Exponential 30 mins (mean) NA NA 
CVN 0.5 hr Exponential 30 mins (mean) NA NA 
UCAV 0.5 hr Exponential 30 mins (mean) NA NA 
DDG 0.125 hr Exponential 7.5 mins (mean) NA NA 
CG 0.125 hr Exponential 7.5 mins (mean) NA NA 
Sweep 
Width 0.25 nm Beta 















Updates 0.5 hr Exponential 
0.5 hrs 
(mean) NA NA 
KILO 
Speed 5 kts Beta 






Table 2. Inputs Setup for Pair 1 (FCW).  Network centricity set to Future Network-
Centric, all input variables are set to their average values, except for submerge time and 
UCAV/Strike latency. 
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The parameters of the stochastic input variables are chosen such that their 
distributions’ means agree with the deterministic values.  See Table 2 for the inputs setup 
of Pair 1.  Note that because the data entry form for the stochastic model is designed to 
facilitate ease of use by the analyst, some input variables have different units, e.g., the 
CVN latency is stated in hours for the deterministic model but minutes for the stochastic 
model.  However, the point to note in the comparison is that the inputs are set to the same 
values (0.5 hours = 30 minutes). 
See Figure 13 and Figure 14 for the outputs10 from the stochastic model.  Note 
that probability (y-axis label) for both histograms refer to the proportion of the 1000 (in 
this case) replications with those values on the x-axis.  The number of replications for the 
stochastic simulation is fixed at 1000 for all the runs in this thesis, and that produces 
stochastic means estimates with halfwidths of less than 1.5 minutes for the effective time 
remaining, and 2.5 percent for Pk, in all the results stated in this report. 

















Figure 13. Stochastic Effective Time Remaining (MOP) for Pair 1 (FCW).  The mean 
stochastic effective time remaining is 1.75 hours, as opposed to the 1.72 hours from the 
deterministic model.  Note the spread of the effective time remaining that is not evident 
from the single value of 1.72 hours obtained from the deterministic model. 
                                                 
10 All the histograms in this report should be interpreted with the general rule, the smallest value on 
the x-axis shows the minimum value from the simulation run, and the largest value shows the maximum 























Figure 14. Stochastic Kill Probability (MOE) for Pair 1 (FCW).  Probability on the y-
axis refers to the proportion of the 1000 replications with kill probability (Pk) shown on 
the x-axis.  Over 950 replications have Pks between 0.92 and 1.00. 
The means of the effective time remaining and kill probability are 1.75 hours and 
0.99 respectively.  Testing the null hypothesis: 
H0: The mean of the stochastic outputs is equal to the deterministic output 










 X  = mean of the stochastic outputs 











Both hypothesis tests have p-values << 0.01, which means we reject H0 at            
α = 0.01.  Although the mean of the stochastic outputs is not statistically equal to the 
deterministic output (according to the hypothesis tests), the stochastic results can still be 
considered to be consistent to the deterministic results, based on the minimal absolute 
deviation between the deterministic and stochastic results. 
Out of the 1000 replications, there are 22 cases where Pk < 0.9 (0.9 is an arbitrary 
choice).  The lowest Pk is 0.22, however, it is not visible in the histogram (Figure 14) due 
to the scale of the y-axis.  A clear pattern from these 22 cases is, low sweep width and 
high time between updates from the ISR submarine.  For the deterministic case, the Pk is 
guaranteed to be at 100 percent, as the effective time remaining for the search and 
detection effort is high at 1.72 hours, and with the search and detection parameters at 
their expected values, Pk is 100 percent.  The element of variance is missing from the 
deterministic case, which provides as much information as the means.  Note that in this 
case, we have little difficulty in sinking the KILO.  In a more difficult situation, the 
variance could cause a divergence between the stochastic simulation Pk and the 
deterministic one. 
2. Pair 2 Comparison (NCW) 
The Pair 2 comparison is exactly the same as Pair 1, except that the network 
centricity is changed to Network-Centric.  The deterministic result: 
Effective time remaining = 1.10 hours 
Pk = 1.00 
The stochastic outputs are in Figure 15 and Figure 16, with their means of 1.17 
hours and Pk of 0.94 respectively.  Hypothesis tests similar to the one conducted for Pair 
1 have been conducted for Pair 2, as well as the remaining four pairs of 
deterministic/stochastic comparisons, and their t-statistics are at least 4.0, and p-values 
much smaller than 0.01, implying that the deterministic and stochastic means are not 
statistically equal.  The detailed computations of the t-statistics for the hypothesis tests 
are left out from the report, as no additional insights can be gained from them. 
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Similar to the conclusions on Pair 1, the Pair 2 stochastic results are consistent 
with the deterministic results, based on the minimal absolute deviation between the 
deterministic and stochastic results.  However, there are 90 cases where Pk < 0.9.  The 
general pattern from these 90 cases is the low time remaining, only averaging 0.53 hours 
(as opposed to the 1.17 hours average for the entire 1000 cases). 




















Figure 15. Stochastic Effective Time Remaining (MOP) for Pair 2 (NCW).  Unlike 
the FCW case in Figure 13, there are close to three percent with effective time remaining 























Figure 16. Stochastic Kill Probability (MOE) for Pair 2 (NCW).  The spread in Pk is 
nothing like the spread for the equivalent effective time remaining (Figure 15).  This is 
due to the greatly nonlinear transfer function of the search and detection mission. 
3. Pair 3 Comparison (PCW) 
Pair 3 comparison is exactly the same as Pair 1, except that the network centricity 
is changed to Platform-Centric.  The deterministic result: 
Effective time remaining = 0.50 hour 
Pk = 1.00  
The stochastic outputs are in Figure 17 and Figure 18, with their means of 0.71 
hour and Pk of 0.68 respectively.  Note that the deterministic model performs poorly, i.e., 
the deterministic means deviates significantly from the stochastic means.  The stochastic 
simulation model produces 223 cases (out of the 1000 replications) with zero Pk.  This is 
vastly inconsistent with the 100 percent Pk derived in the deterministic model.  The 223 
cases have zero Pk because there is no effective time remaining to conduct the search and 
detection mission.  The latencies (messaging and processing delays) in these 223 cases 
add up to more time than it takes for the enemy KILO submarine to submerge.  This, of 
course, never happens in a deterministic model.   
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Having said that, it should be noted that deterministic models could produce 
results close to stochastic simulation models.  This occurs when the results are clear, e.g. 
in another combat context, two opposing sides (blue-to-red) with 100-to-1 ratio, and 
similar combat effectiveness, will produce similar results from both deterministic and 
stochastic simulation model, 100 percent win for the blue force.  However, when it 
becomes a 1.1-to-1 ratio, the deterministic model will still predict a 100 percent win for 
the blue force, while the stochastic simulation model will likely produce the more 
realistic result that blue force may not always win. 















Figure 17. Stochastic Effective Time Remaining (MOP) for Pair 3 (PCW).  The 
“spike” at zero hour is an accumulation of zero as well as negative time remaining (total 
latencies > submerge time, therefore time remaining = submerge time – total latencies = 
negative value). 
An abnormality observed from Figure 17 is the “spike” at zero hour.  This is due 
to the fact that zero hour is an accumulation of zero as well as negative time remaining 
(total latencies > submerge time, therefore, time remaining = submerge time – total 
latencies = negative value).  Total latencies is the sum of several individual latencies, and 
as long as one of the individual latencies gets a big number (which happens not so 
infrequently) in the stochastic replication, the time remaining will become negative, or 
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x1, x2, … are the input variables, such as submerge time and 
missile speed 
 What is implied in the mathematical form is, the deterministic model (to 
the left of ≠) that takes in the expected values of the input variables need 
not produce the same result as the mean of the stochastic outputs, which 
use the input distributions, unless f is linear.  Of course, our simulation has 
many nonlinear components.   
c. A pattern that is apparent from the Pk histograms is, there is always a big 
proportion of data with Pk = 1, and the other data are divided without any 
obvious pattern amongst the other Pks.  The reason for that lies in the 
greatly nonlinear transfer function of the search and detection mission.  
For any set of search and detection parameters, Pk rises rapidly from zero 
to close to one within a small range of effective time remaining (zero hour 
to some “threshold” value).  As long as the effective time remaining for 
the search and detection mission exceeds the “threshold” value (different 
“thresholds” for different search and detection parameters), Pk is “pushed” 
towards one.  When there’s no effective time remaining for the search and 
detection mission, obviously Pk = 0, and for effective time remaining 
between zero hour and the “threshold”, Pk is distributed from zero to one. 
4. Pair 4 Comparison (Random Inputs Set 1) 
To add credibility to the benchmarking exercise, the next three pairs of results are 
based on random inputs.  To elaborate what is meant by random inputs, see Table 3 
column “Excel Implementation”.  An Excel spreadsheet is developed with those formulas 
in Table 3 column “Excel Implementation”, and run three separate times11 to generate the 
random input sets shown in Table 3 column “Random Set 1”, “Random Set 2”, and 
“Random Set 3”.  Note that the random numbers in Table 3 have been rounded to the 
appropriate decimal places according to the deterministic model input requirements.  
Also, the units for the input variables in Table 3 are consistent with the units for the 
                                                 
11 Note that each time the spreadsheet is run (press F9 key); the “RAND()” function in Excel will 
generate a uniform random number between zero and one. 
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Cell A1: =RAND() 
PCW NCW FCW 
Submerge 
Time =2*RAND() 0.39 1.52 1.06 
Complexity 
Penalty =RAND() 0.14 0.69 0.71 
Initial SSN =2*RAND() 0.40 2.00 0.60 
CV =RAND() 0.60 0.85 0.40 
SubGroup =RAND() 0.83 0.20 0.63 
CVN =RAND() 0.27 0.64 0.71 
Strike/UCAV =3*RAND() 0.25 1.31 0.98 
DDG =0.25*RAND() N/A N/A 0.09 
CG =0.25*RAND() N/A N/A 0.22 
Sweep Width =0.5*RAND() 0.35 0.44 0.22 
Missile Speed =200+300*RAND() 333 296 485 
Time b/w 
Updates =RAND() 0.82 0.29 0.25 
KILO Speed =10*RAND() 4.4 3.3 8.7 
Table 3. Random Inputs for Benchmarking.  The second column shows the Excel 
formulas, where the values in the remaining columns are generated randomly. 
The deterministic result for Pair 4: 
Effective time remaining = 0 hour 
Pk = 0 
The reason for zero Pk is the quick submerge time of the KILO submarine, which 
leads to zero time for the search and detection mission.   
The stochastic outputs are shown in Figure 19 and Figure 20, with means of 0.02 
hour and Pk of 0.09 respectively.  There are 62 cases (6.2 percent of the 1000 
replications) with Pk > 0.9.  An analysis of the inputs (random realizations of the 
replications rather than the input parameters, which are fixed for all 1000 replications) for 
these 62 cases show a strong pattern, that all 62 cases have initial SSN report delay that is 
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less than 0.35 hour (mean of the initial SSN report delay is 0.40 hour), and Strike latency 
that is less than 0.32 hour (mean of the Strike latency is 0.25 hour).   
The practical interpretation of this pattern is, if the enemy submarine is expected 
to submerge within a short time (mean of 0.39 hour in this Pair 4 comparison), all efforts 
must be put into achieving a low (< 0.35 hour) initial SSN report delay and low (< 0.32 
hour) Strike latency to have a good (> 0.9) Pk.  This implies the importance of initial 
SSN report and Strike latency in achieving a high Pk. 



















Figure 19. Stochastic Effective Time Remaining (MOP) for Pair 4 (Random Inputs).  
Due to the relatively quick submerge time of 0.39 hour, most of the replications have 






















Figure 20. Stochastic Kill Probability (MO
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Figure 21. Stochastic Effective Time Remaining (MOP) for Pair 5 (Random Inputs).  
The mean stochastic effective time remaining is 0.12 hour as compared to zero hour for 





















Figure 22. Stochastic Kill Probability (M
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6. Pair 6 Comparison (Random Inputs Set 3) 
The deterministic result for Pair 6: 
Effective time remaining = 0.73 hour 
Pk = 1.00  
The stochastic outputs are shown in Figure 23 and Figure 24, with means of 0.80 
hour and Pk of 0.99 respectively.  There are only 21 cases with Pk < 0.9.  The obvious 
pattern from these cases is the relatively high UCAV (note that UCAV latency for FCW 
is the equivalent of Strike latency for PCW and NCW) latencies, with an average of 2.5 
hours (mean of UCAV distribution for Pair 6 is only 0.98 hour).  This reinforces the 
conclusion from Pair 4, i.e., Strike/UCAV latency is a critical factor influencing effective 
time remaining, and subsequently Pk. 
















Figure 23. Stochastic Effective Time Remaining (MOP) for Pair 6 (Random Inputs).  
The mean stochastic effective time remaining is 0.73 hour, as opposed to the 0.80 hour 
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tion parameters, Pk rises rapidly from zero 
ange of effective time remaining (zero hour 
to some “threshold” value).  When the mean effective time remaining is 
significantly higher than the “threshold” value, both deterministic and 
stochastic models produce consistently high Pks.  The deterministic and 
stochastic Pks start to deviate when the mean effective time remaining 
drops near, or even below, the “threshold”.  In general, deterministic and 
stochastic models produce the same results only when the results are clear. 
b. If the total latency is longer than the submerge time of the enemy KILO 
submarine, it does not matter how strong the friendly assets’ capability in 
search and detection is, the Pk is still zero.  This reiterates the importance 
of C4ISR systems and procedures in coming up with timely decisions, 
before any of the physical assets can be effectively put into combat. 
c. The initial SSN report delay and the Strike latency shows up as critical 
factors determining effective time remaining (MOP) and Pk (MOE).  This 
observation confirms the potential of RAND’s framework of metrics and 
measures, which models the importance of the initial SSN report delay and 
Strike latency through Equation (12) (as part of RAND’s framework), 
with their wj set to 1. 
d. All the patterns observed/discussed in this section are not possible (or 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, the stochastic simulation model developed is used to answer three 
questions that RAND, and their sponsors are interested in: 
a. Does improved C4ISR systems and procedures produce a quantifiable 
improvement in the battle outcome, i.e., does kill probability increase in 
the TCT vignette? 
b. Which are the critical processing and messaging delay times that impact 
kill probability the most? 
c. How should platforms be assigned to launch the UCAV in the Future 
Network-Centric system? 
A. NETWORK CENTRICITY COMPARISON 
A key objective of this thesis is to assess the effects of improved C4ISR systems 
and procedures on battle outcomes.  What it translates to in the TCT vignette case study 
is, based on RAND’s framework of measures and metrics, do Future Network-Centric 
systems and procedures produce higher kill probability (Pk) than Platform-Centric or 
Network-Centric systems and procedures?  This is the question to be answered in this 
section.  The procedure used to compare the three networks is: 
a. Generate m sets of inputs (same inputs for all three networks) to be fed to 
the three networks.  
b. Determine the stochastic outputs for the three networks. 
c. Compare the three sets of outputs. 
1. LHS Variant 
An easy way to generate the required m sets of inputs is to adopt the method 
outlined in Table 3 (will be referred to as Simple Random method), which is to randomly 
(within the bounds stated in the deterministic model) generate the various input variables 
to make up one set of inputs.  Repeat the procedure m times.   
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The other method, which is the preferred method, is a variant of Latin Hypercube 
Sampling (LHS), and it will be called the LHS variant in this report.  The procedure of 
the LHS variant is: 
a. Divide each input variable (all continuous in our case) into n equal 
intervals.  The bounds of the input variables are shown in Table 4.  Note 
that the units for all the time variables have been changed (from the 
original simulation model) to be in hours.  This is because it is easier to 
analyze the results with a common time unit. 
Input Variables Lower Bound Upper Bound
Submerge Time (hrs) 0.2 2 
Complexity Penalty 0.1 1 
Initial SSN (hrs) 0.2 2 
CV (hrs) 0.1 1 
SubGroup (hrs) 0.1 1 
CVN (hrs) 0.1 1 
Strike/UCAV (hrs) 0.3 3 
DDG (hrs) 0.025 0.25 
CG (hrs) 0.025 0.25 
Sweep Width (nm) 0.05 0.5 
Missile Speed (kts) 200 500 
Time b/w Updates (hrs) 0.1 1 
KILO Speed (kts) 1 10 
Table 4. Inputs’ Bounds for LHS Variant.  In general, the lower bound is set to 10 
percent of the upper bound. 
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The upper bounds of the input variables are the same as those used in the 
deterministic model.  Most of the lower bounds in the deterministic model 
are very close to zero, except the missile speed with lower bound of 200 
kts.  For this analysis, since the bounds are used to define the range 
whereby the means of the input variables are varied, it is logical for the 
lower bounds to be non-zero.  The lower bounds are set at 10 percent of 
their upper bounds. 
b. Given that 10 percent has been “lopped off”, the remaining 90 percent is 
used to generate 90 equal intervals, i.e., n = 90.  That means for CVN 
latency, there are 91 endpoints to the 90 intervals, 0.1 hour, 0.11 hour, 
0.12 hour, …, 1 hour.  This process of generating 91 endpoints is repeated 
for all input variables. 
c. The next step involves the random selection (without replacement) of an 
endpoint value from each variable to make up a set of inputs.  There are a 
total of 91 sets of inputs.  The S+ codes to generate the 91 sets of inputs, 
given the bounds and n, are attached in Appendix B.  A sample (only the 
first few input variables are shown) of the inputs generated is also attached 
in Appendix B, Table 12.  The advantage of the LHS variant over the 
Simple Random method is the improvement in coverage of the input 
space.  In addition, LHS has been shown to be efficient under a large 
range of conditions (Reference 2). 
d. A total of 2002 (22 sets of 91) sets of inputs are generated.  This is a high 
number, chosen to enable the comparison of the networks to be conducted 
with a high confidence level. 
2. Outputs from the Three Networks 
The outputs (MOP and MOE) generated from the 2002 sets of inputs for the three 
networks are shown in Figure 25 and Figure 26. 
49 




















Figure 25. Network Comparison in Effective Time Remaining (MOP).  The Future 
Network-Centric (FCW, mean of 0.68 hour) systems and procedures produce 
significantly higher effective time remaining than the Platform-Centric (PCW, mean of 























Figure 26. Network Comparison in Kill Probability (MOE).  The Future Network-
Centric (FCW, mean Pk of 0.78) systems and procedures produce significantly higher Pk 
than the Platform-Centric (PCW, mean Pk of 0.20) and Network-Centric (NCW, mean Pk 
of 0.42) cases. 
3. Comparison of Networks 
The means of the MOP and MOE outputs are listed in Table 5.  As mentioned 
earlier, all the simulation runs in this thesis produce stochastic means estimates with 
halfwidths of less than 1.5 minutes for the effective time remaining, and 2.5 percent for 
Pk.  This implies that Future Network-Centric (FCW) systems and procedures produce 
statistically (and practically) superior battle outcomes than Platform-Centric (PCW) and 
Network-Centric (NCW) cases. 
The results confirm the potential of RAND’s framework of measures and metrics 
in modeling the general effects of C4ISR systems and procedures on battle outcomes.  
What remains to be done is the validation and calibration of the framework, i.e., fine-
tuning the framework to achieve results that are consistent with the real world. 
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 Network Centricity Effective Time Remaining (hrs) Pk 
PCW 0.11 0.20 
NCW 0.30 0.42 
FCW 0.68 0.78 
Table 5. Network Comparison of MOP and MOE.  The Future Network-Centric 
(FCW) systems and procedures performs significantly better than the Platform-Centric 
(PCW) and Network-Centric (NCW) cases. 
B. CRITICAL INPUT VARIABLES 
This section answers the question: Which variables affect Pk significantly?  The 
FCW network is used for this analysis as it includes all the input variables, specifically 
the destroyer (DDG) and cruiser (CG) polling latencies that are applicable only to FCW. 
The 2002 input sets used in the previous section are re-used in this analysis.  
Several models within Clementine12 are used to determine the critical variables that 
affect Pk, and extract interesting patterns/relationships within the data.  Clementine is a 
data mining application.  Data mining offers a strategic approach to finding useful 
relationships in large data sets.  The main reasons for using Clementine for the data 
analysis effort are that it’s easy to use, and easy to interpret the results generated.  In 
contrast to more traditional statistical methods, the analyst does not necessarily need to 
know what they are looking for when they start the exploration.  The analyst can explore 
the data, fitting different models and investigating different relationships, until useful 
information is found. 
The Clementine Desktop (Figure 27) makes data exploration easy.  The interface 
uses an approach called visual programming.  Various nodes in the workspace represent 
different objects and actions.  The analyst connects the nodes to form streams, which, 
when executed, enable the analyst to visualize relationships and draw conclusions.  
Streams are like scripts: which can be saved and reused with different data files. 
                                                 
12 Clementine is the software used for the data mining course taught at NPS OR department.  
Interested readers can visit the official website at “http://www.spss.com/spssbi/clementine/”. 
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The Clementine Desktop consists of: 
a. Stream pane: The stream pane is the largest area of the Clementine 
desktop, and is where you build and manipulate data streams.  
b. Palettes: The palettes are located across the bottom of the desktop.  Each 
palette contains a related group of nodes that are available to add to the 
data stream.  For example, the Sources palette contains nodes that you can 
use to read data into your model, and the Graphs palette contains nodes 
that you can use to explore your data visually.  
c. Generated Models palette: The Generated Models palette is located to the 
right of the stream pane, and it contains the results of machine learning 
and modeling that you have done.  
 
Figure 27. Clementine Desktop.  The user drags-and-drop icons from the palettes 
located across the bottom of the DeskTop, build and manipulate data streams on the 
Stream Pane (drawing board), and obtain the models’ outputs from the Generated Models 
Palette. 
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Before the raw data is fed into Clementine, it needs some “touch-up” to maximize 
the power of the data mining models to be employed.  The rule-generating model in 
Clementine that is used, called C5.0 (see Appendix C for a brief description on C5.0) 
requires that the output (Pk) analyzed be of type set (e.g., true-false, high-medium-low), 
i.e., outputs that can be classified into countable classes.  In addition to C5.0, there are 
other rule-generating models that accept continuous outputs, however, in my opinion, 
they do not produce rulesets as informative as the one produced by C5.0 for the data set 
that we are working with. 
As such, Pk has been divided into three classes13 (see Table 6) to facilitate the 
analysis: 
Pk Range PkClass 
< 0.4 1 (low) 
0.4 ≤ Pk < 0.8 2 (medium) 
≥ 0.8 3 (high) 
Table 6. PkClass Definition.  The choices on the number of Pk classes and the 
definition of the range for each class are made to separate those cases with high 
likelihood (PkClass 3, high) of killing the KILO submarine from those with a good 
chance of mission failure (PkClass 1, low) and those cases in between (PkClass 2, 
medium). 
The distribution of PkClass in the 2002 FCW data set is shown in Figure 28.  
About 55 percent of the 2002 cases have Pk ≥ 0.8 (PkClass 3), and there’s only a small 
percentage of cases with Pk < 0.4 (PkClass 1). 
Note that a common practice to derive better-quality rules (rules that apply to a 
significant proportion of the cases, and predicts accurately) is to ensure that the classes 
contain almost equal number of cases.  This method has been tried on the current data set, 
with the Pk range bounds set at 0.7 and 0.9.  No improvement is achieved in the quality 
of the rules/patterns/relationships extracted from the data set.  Thus, the PkClass 
definition is fixed as that stated in Table 6, which at least provides logical definitions for 
the PkClass. 
                                                 
13 The choices on the number of Pk classes and the definition of the range for each class are made to 
separate those cases with high likelihood (PkClass 3, high) of killing the KILO submarine from those with 
a good chance of mission failure (PkClass 1, low) and those cases in between (PkClass 2, medium). 
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Figure 28. PkClass Distribution.  Note the small proportion (4.05 percent) of 
replications with Pk < 0.4 (PkClass 1).  The numbers in the third column add up to 100 
percent, and the fourth column adds up to 2002 replications. 
1. Neural Network 
The first data mining model from Clementine to be used is the neural network 
(Reference 3) model.  See below for the neural network (NN) model generated from the 
2002 cases for FCW. 
 
Neural Network "PKCLASS" architecture 
 
Input Layer     : 13 neurons 
Hidden Layer #1 : 6 neurons 
Output Layer    : 3 neurons 
 
Predicted Accuracy :  94.60% 
 
Relative Importance of Inputs 
STRIKE               : 0.52444 
Initial SSN Report   : 0.51148 
DDG                  : 0.50546 
Submerge Time (T)    : 0.31567 
Mean time between updates (tu) : 0.19936 
CG                   : 0.07770 
Complexity Penalty ( b ) : 0.06990 
KILO Speed (w)       : 0.06732 
Mean Sweep Width (s) : 0.06287 
CVN                  : 0.05975 
CV                   : 0.04829 
Missile Speed (v)    : 0.03489 
SUBGROUP             : 0.01900 
 
See the notes below for interpretation of the NN model. 
Architecture: The architecture or topology of the network is described.  For each 
layer in the network, the number of units in that layer is listed. 
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Predicted Accuracy: This is an index of the accuracy of the predictions.  For 
symbolic outputs, this is simply the percentage of records for which the predicted value is 
correct.  For numeric targets, the calculation is based on the differences between the 
predicted values and the actual values in the training data.  
Relative Importance of Inputs: The input variables are listed in order of 
importance, from most important to least important.  The value listed for each input is a 
measure of its relative importance, varying between zero (a variable that has no effect on 
the prediction) and 1.0 (a variable that completely determines the prediction). 
Note that it is common practice in data mining analysis to split the data set 
equally into a training set and a test set.  The training set is used to develop the models 
and the test set is then used to evaluate the quality of the models developed.  This practice 
works well if the objective of the analysis is to develop a predictive model, and it guards 
against overfitting.  However, this practice is not adopted for the current analysis as our 
main objective is to develop a better feel of how the input variables affect the battle 
outcome, rather than trying to predict the battle outcome from the input variables, since 
we already know how to do that deterministically. 
The interesting portion of the NN model output is the “Relative Importance of 
Inputs” section, which shows that the three most critical factors that determine PkClass 
are the Strike/UCAV, initial SSN report, and DDG latencies.  These three nodes happen 
to be the only three nodes in the FCW Task Force.  This observation confirms the 
potential of RAND’s framework of metrics and measures which models the importance 
of the three factors through Equation (12) (as part of RAND’s framework), with their wj 
set to 1.  The other nodes that are not in the FCW Task Force have their wj set to 0.5.  See 
Table 7 for the wj settings for the three different network centricity.  Note that the wj for 
DDG and CG are zero for the PCW and NCW systems, as they are not part of the PCW 
and NCW systems. 
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 Latency PCW wj NCW wj FCW wj 
Initial SSN 0.5 0.5 0.5 
CV 1 1 1 
SubGroup 1 0.5 0.5 
CVN 1 1 0.5 
Strike/UCAV 1 1 1 
DDG 0 0 1 
CG 0 0 0.5 
Table 7.  wj for Different Network Centricity.  Different nodes make up the Task 
Force under different network centricity. 
The importance of the Strike/UCAV and initial SSN report latencies is reinforced 
by looking at the plot (Figure 29) of the two latencies, with points of different PkClass in 
different color.  The obvious pattern (not so obvious without color) from the plot is, there 
are no cases with Pk < 0.8 (PkClass 1 and 2) in the lower left corner (shape of a triangle) 
of the plot.  This observation does not provide information unexpected by the analyst; 
low latencies lead to high effective time remaining to conduct the search and detection 
mission, which leads to high Pk.  However, what is important about this observation is, 
regardless of the values (within the bounds defined) of the other input variables in the 
system, as long as the Strike/UCAV and initial SSN report latencies can be kept within 
the triangle defined by the plot, we are assured of a high Pk. 
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Figure 29. Strike/UCAV vs. Initial SSN Report Plot.  As long as the Strike/UCAV 
and initial SSN report latencies lie within the triangle shown, regardless of the values 
(within the bounds defined) of the other input variables, Pk ≥ 0.8. 
In order to confirm that it is indeed the working of RAND’s framework of metrics 
and measures that causes the order of the latencies appearing on the NN model, the PCW 




Neural Network "PKCLASS" architecture 
 
Input Layer     : 11 neurons 
Hidden Layer #1 : 6 neurons 
Output Layer    : 3 neurons 
 
Predicted Accuracy :  96.13% 
 
Relative Importance of Inputs 
Strike               : 0.31170 
Initial SSN Report   : 0.26339 
SUBGROUP             : 0.16012 
Submerge Time (T)    : 0.12244 
CV                   : 0.10718 
Mean time between updates (tu) : 0.06753 
CVN                  : 0.04239 
KILO Speed (w)       : 0.02589 
Complexity Penalty ( b ) : 0.01282 
Missile Speed (v)    : 0.00790 
Mean Sweep Width (s) : 0.00532 
 
Note that SubGroup, which is in the PCW Task Force (wj = 1 for PCW), has 
“jumped” to near the front of the list, while being last in the list for FCW.  Another 
reason that may explain the importance of an input variable is its range, i.e., the 
Strike/UCAV latency varies from 0.3 to 3 hours, while CV varies from 0.1 to 1 hour, 
given that they have the same wj settings in the PCW network, the latencies with the 
bigger numbers will have more “weight” in determining Pk. 
2. C5.0 Rulesets 
The C5.0 model (see Appendix C for a brief description) in Clementine can 
produce two kinds of models, decision tree or rulesets.  The rulesets are the ones that are 
used in this analysis, as any patterns/relationships in the data are easy to extract and 
interpret from the rulesets.  The rulesets (for output PkClass) generated from the FCW 
data are shown in Appendix D. 
Note that there is a pair of numbers accompanying each rulesets.  These numbers 
show information on the number of cases to which the rule applies (instances) and the 
proportion of those cases for which the rule is true (confidence). 
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Note that confidence is calculated as: 
(1 + number of cases where rule is correct) / (2 + number of cases to which rule applies) 
This calculation of the confidence estimate adjusts for the process of generalizing 
rules from a decision tree (which is what C5.0 does when it creates a ruleset). 
A good rule is one that has: 
a. High number of instances: The rule applies to a large proportion of the 
data set. 
b. High confidence: For those cases that satisfy the conditions of the rule, the 
rule predicts the correct PkClass most, if not all of the time. 
Note that the main objective in using C5.0 is not to predict PkClass from the 
various input variables, since we know exactly how to calculate Pk from the input 
variables.  Rather, we aim to gain a better feel of the weightage of the various input 
variables in the overall combat picture. 
An example of how the rules should be interpreted: Rule #1 for PkClass 3 (Pk >= 
0.8): If the mean submerge time of the enemy submarine > 1.2 hours, and the mean initial 
SSN report latency <= 1.4 hours, and mean DDG latency <= 0.09 hour, then there is a 
98.2 percent chance that Pk >= 0.8, regardless of the other input variables. 
A few interesting rules generated from the C5.0 model are highlighted for 
discussion. 
Rule#1 for PkClass 1 (Pk < 0.4):  
        if  Submerge Time (T) <= 0.92 
        and  Initial SSN Report > 1.3 
        and  Strike > 1.77 
        and  DDG > 0.142 
        and  CG > 0.067 
        then -> 1 (56, 0.845) 
With a low submerge time and high latencies; Pk has a high chance of being low 
(< 0.4).  There are 9 cases out of the 56 cases that satisfy the conditions with PkClass 2, 
and the maximum Pk from these 9 cases is 0.54, with 6 cases below 0.50. 
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Rule #1 for PkClass 3 (Pk >= 0.8):  
        if  Submerge Time (T) > 1.2 
        and  Initial SSN Report <= 1.4 
        and  DDG <= 0.09 
        then -> 3 (166, 0.982) 
Analyzing the data shows that of the 166 cases that satisfy the condition, there are 
two cases that are PkClass 2, instead of the predicted PkClass 3.  However, these two 
case are exceptionally high PkClass 2, and their Pks are 0.7981, 0.7999, that is, they can 
almost be considered PkClass 3. 
Rule #2 for PkClass 3 (Pk >= 0.8):  
        if  Strike <= 1.56 
        and  DDG <= 0.09 
        and  Mean time between updates (tu) <= 0.6 
        then -> 3 (158, 0.981) 
Analyzing the data shows that of the 158 cases that satisfy the condition, there are 
two cases that are PkClass 2, instead of the predicted PkClass 3.  However, these two 
case are high PkClass 2, with Pks of 0.77 and 0.78. 
This rule is more useful than the previous rule in that it says, if the friendly forces 
can keep the mean Strike/UCAV and DDG latencies below certain times, and get timely 
updates, there is a high chance of having a high Pk, regardless of how soon the enemy 
submerges, or how other input variables vary.  This rule is important in that it sets target 
levels that the friendly forces can work towards. 
Rule #3 for PkClass 3 (Pk >= 0.8):  
        if  DDG <= 0.045 
        then -> 3 (197, 0.98) 
If the friendly forces can achieve a mean destroyer (DDG) latency of <= 0.045 
hour (2.7 minutes), then there’s a 98 percent chance that Pk >= 0.8, regardless of the 
other input variables.  Analyzing the data shows that of the 197 cases that satisfy the 
condition, there are three cases that are PkClass 2, instead of the predicted PkClass 3.  
However, these three cases are high PkClass 2, and their Pks are 0.74, 0.77, and 0.77, 
very close to the PkClass 3 range. 
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The default rule says that if none of the rules apply to a case, assign PkClass 3 to 
the case.  This is a direct result of PkClass 3 being the majority class  
Observations/Conclusions from the C5.0 model: 
a. The input variables that show up most in the rules are the same ones 
“leading” the list for the neural network model developed in the previous 
section, i.e., Strike/UCAV, initial SSN, DDG, and submerge time. 
b. There are fewer rules for PkClass 1 because only about 4 percent of the 
2002 cases are of PkClass 1 (see Figure 28). 
3. Linear Regression 
The Clementine linear regression model estimates the best fitting linear equation 
for predicting the output based on the input variables.  The regression equation represents 
a straight line or plane that minimizes the squared differences between predicted and 
actual output values.  For this analysis, all 13 input variables are used to fit an equation 
for Pk (not PkClass as it will not be logical).  The resultant linear regression equation: 
    -0.004307 * KILO Speed (w) + 
    -0.132599 * Mean time between updates (tu) + 
    0.000006 * Missile Speed (v) + 
    0.068051 * Mean Sweep Width (s) + 
    -0.183708 * CG + 
    -1.29667 * DDG + 
    -0.109762 * Strike + 
    -0.025286 * CVN + 
    -0.0106 * SUBGROUP + 
    -0.016936 * CV + 
    -0.186999 * Initial SSN Report + 
    -0.012818 * Complexity Penalty ( b ) + 
    0.109087 * Submerge Time (T) + 
    1.361112 
Similar conclusions from the neural network and C5.0 ruleset models are 
obtained, i.e., critical inputs have relatively bigger coefficients than those unimportant 
inputs.  Note that another factor that may affect the size of the coefficients are the ranges 
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of the variables, i.e., missile speed with a range between 200 and 500 kts will generally 
have a lower coefficient that complexity penalty that ranges from zero to one, although 
both these variables may be as insignificant in affecting Pk. 
As mentioned, the main objective of this analysis is to obtain a better feel of the 
importance of each input variable in the final battle outcome, and not to build a model to 
predict Pk from the inputs, since the exact formulas for calculating Pk from the inputs are 
known.  Therefore, no further exploration or analysis of the linear regression model is 
conducted. 
In this section, three data mining models have been used to determine the 
variables that have the greatest impact on the kill probability.  All three models arrive at 
the same conclusion that the critical variables to the time-critical target vignette, Future 
Network-Centric system, are the Strike/UCAV latency, initial SSN report latency, DDG 
latency, and enemy submarine submerge time.  The two general factors that determine 
the impact of an input variable on kill probability are: (i) whether the system is part of the 
Task Force and (ii) the range of the input variable. 
C. POLLING OPTIONS FOR FCW 
The question to be answered in this section is: How should platforms be assigned 
to launch the UCAV in the Future Network-Centric system?  This is essentially a 
command and control question that addresses the way the richly connected network is 
utilized to support combat operations.  The three options (see Table 8)14 require different 
times for collaboration and UCAV fly out. 
                                                 
14 Table extracted from Reference 1. 
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Poll all potential combatants with 
UCAVs and select the one that 
can get to the target quickest 
Large cost in collaboration time 
Most reliable solution 
Fastest fly out time for UCAV 
Case 2: 
Periodic 




Poll a select subset of combatants 
with UCAVs considered to be in 
the best position to respond.  
Repeat this process periodically 
Less cost in collaboration time 
Least reliable solution 







Poll all combatants with UCAVs 
periodically and designate one as 
the “duty” launcher 
Moderate cost in collaboration 
time 
Less reliable solution 
Possibly greatest fly out time for 
the UCAV 
Table 8. Polling Options for FCW.  Different polling options have different effects 
on collaboration and UCAV fly out. 
1. Case 1: Complete Polling at Execution Time 
Although the most reliable method (in the sense that the target’s location is 
known and therefore, distances to the target are known), considerable time is absorbed by 
collaborating to arrive at an “optimal” selection based on distance to the target.  
Calculating the distances to the target from the candidate platforms at execution time 
means that the time required to fly to the release point for the SLAM-ER is minimized.   
2. Case 2: Periodic Polling of a Subset at Execution Time 
In this case, a periodically selected subset of the platforms with the UCAV is 
polled at execution time.  Because the number of platforms polled is reduced, the 
collaboration time required at execution is not as great.  The fact that the pre-selection is 
time consuming has little impact on the delay at execution time.  The reliability of the 
pre-selected choice in terms of the time required to reach the target is however, reduced.  
There are two reasons for this: (i) the selection of the subset of platforms was based on 
conditions that may not be prevalent at execution time, and (ii) closely related is the fact 
that the platform that is selected to execute may be sub-optimal when compared to the 
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entire set of platforms with the UCAV.  The impact on fly out time is that it will likely be 
extended. 
3. Case 3: Periodic Complete Polling 
In this case, the entire set of platforms with the UCAV is polled periodically.  The 
fact that polling takes place prior to the operation means that little time is spent deciding 
which platform will launch the UCAV at execution time.  The reliability of the pre-
selected choice however, is less reliable than selection at execution time.  In this case, the 
fact that all platforms are polled mitigates the deficiency somewhat.  The impact on fly 
out time for the UCAV is greater than the first case, but not as long as the second. 
4. Analysis of the Polling Options 
Table 9 lists the mean times associated with the three options discussed.  Note 
that only the times that are likely to vary based on the conditions described are listed.  
The procedure adopted to compare the effectiveness of the polling options is: 
a. Using the same 2002 input sets generated earlier, replace the latencies for 
those input variables stated in Table 9 with the values for Case 1. 
b. Run the stochastic simulation under FCW. 












Case 1: Complete 
Polling at execution 
time 
15 10 17 17 5 64 
Case 2: Periodic 
selection from a subset 
of UCAV platforms 
8 7 - - 20 35 
Case 3: Periodic 
complete polling of 
UCAV platforms 
8 7 9 9 10 43 
All times in minutes. 
Table 9. Time Estimates for Polling Options.  Different polling options require 
different times for collaboration and UCAV fly out. 
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The MOP and MOE histograms are shown in Figure 30 and Figure 31 
respectively. 























Figure 30. Polling Options Comparison in Effective Time Remaining (MOP).  
Periodic selection from a subset of UCAV platforms (polling option Case 2) produces 
slightly higher effective time remaining than the other two polling options. 
The means of the MOP and MOE are stated in Table 10.  Note that the results in 
the current section show superior performance (higher Pk) compared to the previous 
sections.  This is because the latencies used in the three polling options have means 
significantly lower than those of previous sections, which leads to higher effective time 
remaining and subsequently, higher Pk. 
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Figure 31. Polling Options Comparison in Kill Probability (MOE).  Periodic selection 
from a subset of UCAV platforms (polling option Case 2) produces slightly higher kill 
probability (Pk) than the other two polling options. 
Polling Option Effective Time Remaining (hrs) Pk 
Case 1 0.99 0.966 
Case 2 1.04 0.973 
Case 3 1.00 0.969 
Table 10. Polling Options Comparison of MOP and MOE.  No significant 
differences between the three polling options. 
The results show that Case 2 is slightly more effective than the other two polling 
options, but does that constitute a significant practical difference?  The analysis from the 
stochastic simulation model shows that there are no significant practical differences 
between the three polling options.  However, if this conclusion is inconsistent with the 
real-world situation, there is a need to review the framework of measures and metrics.  
Have the positive effects of collaboration been overly “exaggerated”, so much so as to 
“squeeze” the effects of latencies, that a difference of 29 minutes (Table 9 Case 1 total 
latency of 64 minutes vs. Case 2 total latency of 35 minutes) in latencies when passed 
through the framework produce outputs that are insignificantly different.  Or are there 
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other reasons?  This will be part of the future validation required on the framework of 





Based on RAND’s framework of measures and metrics to assess the impact of 
C4ISR systems and procedures on battle outcomes, a stochastic simulation model has 
been developed, benchmarked, and utilized to analyze issues that are important to 
RAND’s research for the U.S. Navy. 
A. BENCHMARKING 
The developed simulation model is benchmarked against RAND’s existing 
deterministic model, and it produces consistent results with the deterministic model, i.e., 
low kill probability (MOE) in the stochastic model generally goes with low kill 
probability in the deterministic model, and vice versa.  Having said that, the mean of the 
stochastic outputs should not be expected to match up exactly to the deterministic output, 
and that is a consequence of the nonlinear transfer function from RAND’s framework of 
metrics and measures. 
For any set of search and detection parameters, Pk rises rapidly from zero to close 
to one within a small range of effective time remaining (zero hour to some “threshold” 
value) to conduct the search and detection mission.  When the mean effective time 
remaining is significantly higher than the “threshold” value, both the deterministic and 
stochastic models produce consistently high Pks.  The deterministic and stochastic Pks 
start to deviate when the mean effective time remaining drops near, or even below the 
“threshold”. 
In general, deterministic and stochastic models produce the same results only 
when the results are clear, e.g. in another combat context, two opposing sides (blue-to-
red) with 100-to-1 ratio, and similar combat effectiveness, will produce similar results 
from both deterministic and stochastic simulation model, a 100 percent win for the blue 
force.  However, when it becomes a 1.1-to-1 ratio, the deterministic model will still 
predict a 100 percent win for the blue force, while the stochastic simulation model will 
produce a more realistic result that blue force may not always win. 
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B. NETWORK CENTRICITY COMPARISON 
The stochastic simulation results show that Future Network-Centric systems and 
procedures produce significantly higher kill probabilities than the Platform-Centric and 
Network-Centric case.  The results confirm the potential of RAND’s framework of 
measures and metrics in modeling the general effects of C4ISR systems and procedures 
on battle outcomes.  What remains to be done is the validation of the framework, i.e., 
fine-tuning the framework to achieve results that are consistent with the real world. 
C. CRITICAL INPUT VARIABLES 
Three data mining models have been used to determine the variables that have the 
greatest impact on the kill probability.  All three models arrive at the same conclusion 
that the critical variables to the time-critical target vignette, Future Network-Centric 
system are the Strike/UCAV latency, initial SSN report latency, DDG latency, and enemy 
submarine submerge time.  The two general factors that determine the impact of an input 
variable on kill probability are: (i) whether the system is part of the Task Force and (ii) 
the range of the input variable. 
D. POLLING OPTIONS FOR FCW 
There are no significant differences between the three polling options to assign 
the platform for launching the UCAV in the Future Network-Centric system.  If this 
conclusion is inconsistent with what we expect in real-world situations, there is a need to 
review the framework of measures and metrics. 
 
70 
APPENDIX A. SIMULATION DEVELOPMENT 
A. VARIABLE DISTRIBUTIONS 
Table 11 documents the distributions used to represent the various latencies and 
the search and detection variables.  The distributions have been discussed and agreed 
with RAND (and through them, their Navy sponsors.) 
Input Variable Distribution 
Submerge Time Beta 
Complexity Penalty Constant 








Mean Sweep Width Beta 
Missile Speed Beta 
Mean Time b/w Updates Exponential 
KILO Speed Beta 
Table 11. Variable Distributions.  The distributions have been discussed and agreed 
with RAND (and through them, their Navy sponsors). 
B. DATA ENTRY FORM 
The data entry form (Figure 32) is created using Visual Basic for Applications 
(VBA) in Excel.  It is activated by clicking the "Simulation EDA Tool" command button 
in two locations, “Vignette2” worksheet cell D23, and “SimGen” worksheet cell C3. 
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Figure 32. Data Entry Form.  The stochastic simulation model requires parameters 
for 13 input variables, segregated into three frames, “Global Settings”, “Latencies”, and 
“Detection”. 
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Features Description (in order of top-down, left-to-right on the form) 
a. Network Centricity: Select the network centricity to be analyzed.  
b. Number of Runs: Enter the number of runs/replications for the 
simulation.  Estimated run time is approximately 50 seconds for 1000 
runs on a Pentium III, 667 Mhz PC with 128 Mb RAM.  In the current 
model design, the number of rows in a single worksheet restricts the 
maximum number of replications, which at 65,536 is more than sufficient 
for the purposes of this study. 
c. Global Settings 
i. Submerge Time (hrs): The distribution is beta with three 
parameters, minimum, maximum and mode, from left to right. 
ii. Complexity Penalty: This variable is a constant between zero and 
one.  It is used as a multiplying factor to adjust b in Equation (15). 
d. Latencies 
Note that the units of time for submerge time and the other time-related 
latencies are different.  This is a direct result of the fact that latencies are 
usually much shorter than submerge time, and so it’s easier for the users to 
provide the latencies in minutes rather than in hours. 
i. Initial SSN Report (minutes): The distribution is gamma with two 
parameters, minimum and mean.  However, there need to be 3 
parameters to pin down a gamma distribution. I have currently 
assumed that the parameters alpha = beta.   
ii.. CV to CG (minutes): The distributions are exponential with mean 
as the only parameter. 
e. Detection 
i. Sweep Width (nm), Missile Speed (kts), and KILO Speed (kts): 
The distributions are beta with three parameters, minimum, 
maximum and mode, from left to right. 
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ii. Time Between Updates (hrs): The distribution is exponential with 
mean as the only parameter. 
f. Command Buttons (at bottom of the form) 
i. Simulate: The inputs entered on the data entry form are saved in 
the spreadsheet, and the simulation will start.  After the simulation 
ends, the data entry form is closed and the results (MOP and MOE 
histograms and confidence intervals) are presented on the 
spreadsheet. 
ii. Save: The inputs entered on the data entry form are saved in the 
spreadsheet.  The data entry form will remain open.  This is useful 
when you need to verify certain data in the midst of a data entry 
session, and you want to save the portion of the data that are 
already entered. 
iii. Cancel: The changes made on the current data entry form are 
ignored, and the data entry form will be closed. 
iv. Close button at the top right hand corner: Same effect as Cancel. 
g. Entering Inputs: The user can enter data sequentially using the "Enter" or 
"Tab" keys.  If the user needs only to change a few parameters, it may be 
easier to use the mouse to highlight the input cells that require change. 
h. Tool Tip: All the input cells provide the user with the type of parameters 
required, i.e., when you move the mouse over an input cell, the screen will 
show “minimum”, “maximum”, “mode”, or “mean”. 
i. Data Verification: The spreadsheet automatically verifies the data that the 
user has entered before saving or simulating, i.e., the spreadsheet prompts 
the user to re-enter values if, e.g., minimum > maximum for one of the 
beta distributions. 
j. Distribution Parameters: Other than saving the raw data on the form to the 
spreadsheet when the “Save” button is clicked, the alphas and betas of the 
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distribution are calculated from the minimums, means, etc., and saved in 
the worksheet. 
C. MS EXCEL IMPLEMENTATION  
The main benefit of implementing the RAND EDA tool stochastic simulation in 
MS Excel is its widespread availability in DoD organizations.  It provides a universal 
platform that users of all levels are comfortable with, and thus reduces any unnecessary 
startup time to familiarize with the application’s user environment. 
Furthermore, since the original RAND EDA tool is implemented in Excel, it 
makes sense to “attach” the stochastic simulation model to the original tool as long as the 
limitations of the Excel applications does not overly restrict the analysis capability 
required of the study, which is the case here. 
The formulas and assumptions modeled into MS Excel are documented below in 
the order of the developmental process, i.e., generation of random variables from the 
user-defined parameters, calculation of the effects of collaboration and complexity to the 
total latencies, calculation of the confidence interval of the effective remaining time 
(MOP) and kill probability (MOE), and their histograms.  The entire stochastic 
simulation model is coded in the “SimGen” worksheet within the RAND EDA tool. 
1. Random Variables Generation 
The cells A1-L18 on the “SimGen” worksheet are used to generate the random 
variables. 
a. Beta (min, max, mode): The following algorithm/pseudo code is 
implemented to compute the alpha and beta parameters from the 
parameters that the user provides.  As mentioned in the previous section, 
the alphas and betas of the distribution are calculated and saved in the 

































The underlying principles for the above algorithm comes from the fact that 
the input variables that are fitted with a beta distribution are those with 
obvious minimum and maximum bounds, and a nominal value, similar to 
a triangular distribution.  Thus, the minimum, maximum and mode of the 
triangular distribution are transformed to derive the alpha and beta 
parameters of a beta distribution.  The means and variances (Reference 4) 
of a triangular distribution are matched up with that of a beta distribution 
to derive the parameters of the beta distribution.   








For the beta distribution: 










With the alpha and beta parameters, the Excel implementation for the beta 
random variable is: “=BETAINV(RAND(), alpha, beta, min, max)”, 
where RAND() is the Excel function to get a Uniform(0,1) random 
variable, and BETAINV is the inverse beta function. 
b. Gamma (min, mean): The following algorithm/pseudo code is 
implemented to compute the alpha and beta parameters from the user-
provided minimum and mean.  The assumption of the algorithm is, 
parameter alpha = beta.  This assumption is necessary, as 3 parameters are 
required to “pin down” a gamma distribution.  Another way to resolve this 
problem is to ask the user to provide the third parameter other than 
minimum and mean, either the variance or the mode of the distribution, 
which may not be easy for the user. 
   
alphabeta
meanalpha













The Excel implementation is: “=GAMMAINV(RAND(), alpha, beta) + 
min”, where GAMMAINV is the inverse gamma function.  Due to Excel’s 
characteristics, when the mean provided by the user is very close to the 
min, the result from GAMMAINV(RAND(), alpha, beta) may sometimes 
be smaller than the smallest number presentable in Excel, and Excel will 
output “#NUM!” in the cell.  This causes error in the simulation output.   
Two additional cells B35-B36 are used to solve this problem.  B35 has the 
formula “=GAMMAINV(RAND(), alpha, beta) + min”, and B36 checks if 
the result from B35 is so small that “#NUM!” is the output.  The resultant 
gamma random variable generated in cell C8 is the result of an “if-else” 
statement based on B35-B36. 
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c. Exponential (mean): The Excel implementation is:  
“=-mean*LN(RAND())” 
where: 
LN is the natural logarithm. 
2. Collaboration 
Collaboration acts to reduce the expected time to complete the mission.  The 
effects of collaboration on each node are different, depending on the knowledge of those 
nodes that they are connected to.  The mathematical form (in the framework of metrics 
and measures recommended by RAND) of the contribution of collaboration to node i’s 
effective latency is expressed as the product in Equation (12), repeated below: 
( )( ) jinj j tK ω=∏ −1 1  
where: 
( )tK j  is the knowledge function of node j, it represents the quality of the 
processes and equipment at node j, 1.0 represents high quality, and 0.0 implies low 
quality 
in  is the degree of node i 

=
        ForceTask  in the is  node if    0.1




Cells X26-BF52 calculate the collaboration contributions for each node, under 
each network centricity.  The intermediate results: 
a. Original Latencies (X35-AD38): These are the random numbers generated 
from the distributions.  These numbers change for each replication. 
b. Information Entropy (X39-AD42): All latencies, except the initial SSN 
report latency have an exponential distribution.  The mean latencies of the 
exponential distributions provide the λ parameter required to calculate the 
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knowledge function.  The computation of the knowledge function for the 
gamma distributed initial SSN report is different from the exponential 
distribution, and it is explained next. 
c. Knowledge Function (AE39-AK42) 
i. Exponential Distribution (mean 1/λ): The formula to calculate the 
knowledge function for the exponential distribution is stated in 
Equation (7), repeated below: 



























 minλ  represents the minimum rate that corresponds to the 
maximum expected time, minλ 15 is chosen to be 0.5, implying that 
the maximum expected latency is 2.0 hours.  M is chosen to be 40, 
implying perfect knowledge if the expected latency is ≤ 1/20 hour. 
ii. Gamma Distribution (α and β): The information entropy of a 
gamma distribution (Reference 5) is: 
[ ] ( ) ( ) ααψααβ +−−Γ= 1)(ln)(dH  
where: 
( )αψ  is the first derivative of Euler’s gamma, 
( ) ( )ααψ = α Γd
d  
The following code (Reference 6) can compute an approximation 
to ( )αψ accurate to 10 decimal places: 
                                                 
15 Note that although information entropy is a universally accepted theory, the knowledge function is 
part of the framework of measures and metrics recommended by RAND, with the choices of minλ  and M 
based on educated guesses. 
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An appropriate knowledge function (Reference 6) is: 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]dHdHedK max1 −−= φ  
When , knowledge K(d) is zero.  Therefore, we associate 
minimum knowledge with maximum entropy as desired.  As  gets 
smaller, knowledge improves. 
( ) ( )dHdH max=
( )dH
d. Knowledge Functions (  (AE35-AK38):  Under different 
network centricity, the Task Force consists of different nodes, which 
means different w
( ) jwj tK−1 )
)
j for the nodes. 
e. Product of Knowledge Functions for Different Network Centricity 
 (AL35-BF38): Under different network centricity, each 
node is connected to a different set of nodes, i.e., it collaborates with a 




ω∏ = −1 1
f. Latencies for Different Network Centricity (BG35-CD38): The three sets 
of effective latencies are calculated from the product of the knowledge 
functions and the original latencies. 
g. Collaboration-Induced Latency (CE35-CE38): The total effective latency, 




The number of connections within the TCT network increases from Platform-
Centric (4) to Network-Centric (8) to Future Network-Centric (12)16.  The complexity 


















β is the user-provided complexity penalty, between zero and one 
C is the number of connections 
Figure 9 illustrates a typical complexity function for zero to 45 possible 
connections of the TCT network. 
The complexity/collaboration-induced latency is calculated (CF32-CK38) by: 
( )
1Complexity/Collaboration induced latency Collaboration induced latency
1 g C
= ×−  
4. Effective Time Remaining (MOP) 
The effective time remaining (MOP) is calculated (CM35-CM38) by subtracting 
the complexity/collaboration-induced latency from the submerge time of the KILO 
submarine. 
5. Kill Probability (MOE) 
The kill probability formula as stated in Equation (22) is: 









The formula is implemented in cells A23-A33. 
                                                 
16 As with all other aspects of the framework of measures and metrics, the number of connections are 
based on educated guesses, validation on the number of connections remains a future task. 
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6. Replicating the Simulation 
With the user-provided parameters, a VBA Excel macro will automatically 
replicate the simulation, drawing different random numbers for each replication.  As a 
rough guide, the estimated run time for 1000 replications is 50 seconds on a Pentium III, 
667 Mhz Pc with 128 Mb RAM. 
7. Outputs 
The confidence intervals (user can define the confidence level) for the effective 
time remaining (MOP) and kill probability (MOE) are calculated in cells EF1-EH11, 






APPENDIX B. LHS S+CODES 
The original version of the codes below has been provided by Thomas W. Lucas.  
Slight modifications to it have been made for this analysis. 
 
LHC <- function(theMatrix, npoints)
{
 f <- function(m,n)
  {
    lb <- m[1]
    ub <- m[2]
    i <- (m[2]-m[1])/(n-1)
    return(seq(m[1],m[2],i))
  }
  hyper.design.temp <- apply(theMatrix, 1, f, npoints)
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APPENDIX C. LHS INPUT SETS 




Initial SSN Report CV SubGroup CVN 
1 0.6 0.2 0.62 0.14 0.71 0.66 
2 0.7 0.88 1.28 0.48 0.66 0.86 
3 0.94 0.65 0.22 0.36 0.52 0.49 
4 0.64 1 0.78 0.64 0.88 0.28 
5 0.52 0.14 0.98 0.84 0.22 0.89 
6 1.96 0.15 1.54 0.93 0.63 0.31 
7 1.52 0.39 1.88 0.74 0.72 0.47 
8 1.6 0.57 1.76 0.29 0.65 1 
9 0.38 0.54 1.16 0.68 0.34 0.48 
10 0.96 0.12 1.66 0.82 0.84 0.61 
11 0.66 0.23 0.56 1 0.87 0.8
12 1.46 0.3 1.36 0.8 0.67 0.83 
13 1.94 0.9 0.94 0.25 0.96 0.87 
14 1.18 0.84 0.6 0.12 1 0.23 
15 1.9 0.95 1.52 0.94 0.4 0.14 
16 1.8 0.74 1.84 0.59 0.83 0.24 
17 1.76 0.34 1.92 0.98 0.25 0.12 
18 2 0.81 1.02 0.9 0.56 0.92 
19 1.12 0.56 1.42 0.17 0.99 0.7
20 1.2 0.5 2 0.7 0.64 0.13 
21 1.44 0.85 0.26 0.42 0.15 0.56 
22 0.74 0.55 0.2 0.11 0.2 0.15 
23 0.82 0.59 0.84 0.51 0.42 0.46 
24 0.72 0.69 1.06 0.21 0.91 0.63 
25 0.9 0.17 1.32 0.6 0.98 0.35 
26 0.22 0.16 1.68 0.24 0.89 0.79 
27 1.32 0.42 1.72 0.46 0.85 0.55 
28 0.36 0.52 1.3 0.1 0.46 0.54 
29 1.06 0.6 1.04 0.41 0.39 0.1
30 1.34 0.43 1.78 0.81 0.32 0.21 
31 0.44 0.64 0.66 0.96 0.29 0.71 
32 1.84 0.94 1.1 0.71 0.48 0.17 
33 0.32 0.38 0.8 0.61 0.41 0.36 
34 0.84 0.89 0.44 0.85 0.37 0.29 
35 0.34 0.19 0.48 0.45 0.28 0.99 
36 1.42 0.78 0.24 0.35 0.82 0.73 
37 1 0.76 0.96 0.4 0.51 0.34 
38 1.02 0.75 1.12 0.32 0.23 0.9
39 1.16 0.71 0.88 0.16 0.93 0.33 
40 0.76 0.32 0.36 0.49 0.94 0.76 
41 0.28 0.7 0.28 0.22 0.5 0.72 
42 1.36 0.36 0.54 0.37 0.45 0.74 
43 1.68 0.41 1.94 0.95 0.97 0.95 
44 1.62 0.48 1.34 0.52 0.75 0.97 
45 1.1 0.24 0.72 0.89 0.43 0.6
46 0.98 0.11 0.58 0.44 0.47 0.44 
47 0.56 0.79 1.48 0.34 0.31 0.43 
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48 1.26 0.31 1.26 0.53 0.27 0.81 
49 0.54 0.8 0.46 0.99 0.58 0.67 
50 0.88 0.63 1.8 0.56 0.74 0.85 
51 1.28 0.91 0.74 0.13 0.19 0.64 
52 0.78 0.73 1.4 0.18 0.62 0.3
53 0.24 0.29 1.96 0.26 0.9 0.52 
54 1.3 0.53 1.98 0.77 0.12 0.96 
55 1.08 0.21 0.92 0.23 0.3 0.84 
56 0.8 0.4 1.24 0.87 0.38 0.38 
57 1.54 0.72 1.44 0.79 0.17 0.5
58 1.22 0.99 1.58 0.88 0.8 0.98 
59 1.56 0.22 1.9 0.75 0.16 0.65 
60 0.46 0.13 1.5 0.47 0.95 0.51 
61 1.5 0.82 0.9 0.86 0.35 0.26 
62 1.58 0.83 0.5 0.5 0.86 0.4
63 0.68 0.45 1.86 0.15 0.76 0.91 
64 1.98 0.68 1.7 0.63 0.44 0.58 
65 1.38 0.67 1.2 0.67 0.7 0.37 
66 0.4 0.98 1.64 0.73 0.36 0.77 
67 0.86 0.44 0.82 0.27 0.57 0.78 
68 1.72 0.49 0.64 0.55 0.68 0.62 
69 0.26 0.1 0.38 0.91 0.33 0.57 
70 1.78 0.58 1.6 0.97 0.21 0.45 
71 1.74 0.25 1 0.65 0.53 0.93 
72 1.24 0.46 1.46 0.33 0.78 0.94 
73 0.5 0.51 0.68 0.62 0.79 0.11 
74 0.42 0.33 1.62 0.72 0.54 0.2
75 0.92 0.77 1.18 0.19 0.69 0.88 
76 1.82 0.96 1.38 0.39 0.92 0.41 
77 1.86 0.86 0.42 0.66 0.24 0.27 
78 0.3 0.92 0.4 0.3 0.14 0.32 
79 0.58 0.62 0.3 0.54 0.6 0.16 
80 1.64 0.18 0.52 0.28 0.61 0.53 
81 1.92 0.27 0.86 0.31 0.13 0.69 
82 0.62 0.35 0.76 0.78 0.77 0.68 
83 1.04 0.28 1.82 0.38 0.18 0.39 
84 0.48 0.97 1.08 0.57 0.55 0.59 
85 1.4 0.37 0.7 0.69 0.81 0.18 
86 1.66 0.61 0.32 0.92 0.49 0.19 
87 1.7 0.26 1.74 0.83 0.73 0.75 
88 1.88 0.87 1.14 0.76 0.26 0.82 
89 1.48 0.47 0.34 0.2 0.59 0.22 
90 0.2 0.66 1.56 0.43 0.11 
91 1.14 0.93 1.22 0.58 0.1 0.42 
0.25 
Table 12. Latin Hypercube Sampling Input Sets Sample.  Note that not all input 
variables are shown in this sample.  Each variable is divided into 90 equal intervals 
(giving 91 endpoints). 
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APPENDIX D. C5.0 DESCRIPTION 
A C5.0 model works by splitting the sample based on the variable that provides 
the maximum expected reduction in information entropy.  Each subsample defined by the 
first split is then split again, usually based on a different variable, and the process repeats 
until the subsamples cannot be split any further.  Finally, the lowest level splits are re-
examined, and those that do not contribute significantly to the value of the model are 
removed or pruned. 
C5.0 can produce two kinds of models.  A decision tree is a straightforward 
description of the splits found by the algorithm.  Each terminal or "leaf" node describes a 
particular subset of the training data, and each case in the training data belongs to exactly 
one terminal node in the tree.  In other words, exactly one prediction is possible for any 
particular data record presented to a decision tree. 
In contrast, a ruleset is a set of rules that tries to make predictions for individual 
records.  Rulesets are derived from decision trees, and in a way represent a simplified or 
distilled version of the information found in the decision tree.  Rulesets can often retain 
most of the important information from a full decision tree, but with a less complex 
model.  Because of the way rulesets work, they do not have the same properties as 
decision trees.  The most important difference is that with a ruleset, more than one rule 
may apply for any particular record, or no rules at all may apply.  If multiple rules apply, 
each rule gets a weighted "vote" based on the confidence associated with that rule, and 
the final prediction is decided by combining the weighted votes of all the rules that apply 
to the record in question.  If no rule applies, a default prediction is assigned to the record. 
C5.0 models are quite robust in the presence of problems such as missing data and 
large numbers of variables.  They usually do not require long training times to estimate.  
In addition, C5.0 models tend to be easier to understand than some other model types, 
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APPENDIX E. C5.0 RULESETS 
Rules for 1: 
    Rule #1 for 1:  
        if  Submerge Time (T) <= 0.92 
        and  Initial SSN Report > 1.3 
        and  Strike > 1.77 
        and  DDG > 0.142 
        and  CG > 0.067 
        then -> 1 (56, 0.845) 
    Rule #2 for 1: 
        if  Initial SSN Report > 1.18 
        and  Strike > 1.59 
        and  DDG > 0.21 
        and  Mean time between updates (tu) > 0.68 
        then -> 1 (31, 0.758) 
 
Rules for 2: 
    Rule #1 for 2: 
        if  Submerge Time (T) <= 1.2 
        and  Initial SSN Report > 0.84 
        and  Strike > 1.56 
        and  DDG > 0.045 
        and  DDG <= 0.09 
        and  Missile Speed (v) <= 313.333 
        then -> 2 (34, 0.944) 
    Rule #2 for 2: 
        if  Initial SSN Report > 1.26 
        and  Strike > 0.78 
        and  Strike <= 1.05 
        and  DDG > 0.125 
        and  Mean time between updates (tu) > 0.57 
        then -> 2 (21, 0.913) 
    Rule #3 for 2: 
        if  Submerge Time (T) > 0.94 
        and  Initial SSN Report > 0.44 
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        and  Strike > 2.52 
        and  DDG > 0.14 
        and  DDG <= 0.22 
        then -> 2 (59, 0.885) 
    Rule #4 for 2: 
        if  Submerge Time (T) <= 0.94 
        and  Initial SSN Report > 0.44 
        and  Initial SSN Report <= 0.84 
        and  Strike > 1.44 
        and  DDG > 0.08 
        then -> 2 (78, 0.863) 
    Rule #5 for 2: 
        if  Submerge Time (T) <= 0.68 
        and  Initial SSN Report > 0.84 
        and  Strike > 0.45 
        and  Strike <= 1.05 
        and  DDG > 0.125 
        then -> 2 (37, 0.846) 
    Rule #6 for 2: 
        if  Submerge Time (T) > 0.94 
        and  Initial SSN Report > 0.44 
        and  Strike > 1.44 
        and  DDG > 0.22 
        then -> 2 (79, 0.84) 
    Rule #7 for 2:  
        if  Submerge Time (T) > 0.68 
        and  Initial SSN Report > 1.56 
        and  Strike > 0.63 
        and  DDG > 0.125 
        and  Mean time between updates (tu) <= 0.57 
        then -> 2 (76, 0.833) 
    Rule #8 for 2: 
        if  Initial SSN Report > 1.26 
        and  Strike <= 1.05 
        and  DDG > 0.18 
        and  Missile Speed (v) <= 346.667 
        and  Mean time between updates (tu) > 0.57 
90 
        then -> 2 (20, 0.773) 
    Rule #9 for 2: 
        if  Initial SSN Report > 0.84 
        then -> 2 (1272, 0.547) 
 
Rules for 3: 
    Rule #1 for 3: 
        if  Submerge Time (T) > 1.2 
        and  Initial SSN Report <= 1.4 
        and  DDG <= 0.09 
        then -> 3 (166, 0.982) 
    Rule #2 for 3: 
        if  Strike <= 1.56 
        and  DDG <= 0.09 
        and  Mean time between updates (tu) <= 0.6 
        then -> 3 (158, 0.981) 
    Rule #3 for 3: 
        if  DDG <= 0.045 
        then -> 3 (197, 0.98) 
    Rule #4 for 3: 
        if  Submerge Time (T) > 1.2 
        and  Strike <= 1.95 
        and  DDG <= 0.09 
        then -> 3 (161, 0.975) 
    Rule #5 for 3: 
        if  Initial SSN Report <= 1.36 
        and  DDG <= 0.09 
        and  Mean time between updates (tu) <= 0.6 
        then -> 3 (213, 0.953) 
    Rule #6 for 3: 
        if  Submerge Time (T) > 1.52 
        and  Strike <= 1.59 
        and  DDG <= 0.158 
        then -> 3 (142, 0.938) 
    Rule #7 for 3: 
        if  Submerge Time (T) > 0.92 
        and  Initial SSN Report <= 1.18 
91 
        and  Mean time between updates (tu) <= 0.24 
        then -> 3 (114, 0.922) 
    Rule #8 for 3: 
        if  Strike <= 1.05 
        then -> 3 (572, 0.838) 
    Rule #9 for 3:  
        if  Initial SSN Report <= 0.84 
        then -> 3 (730, 0.821) 
 
Default : -> 3 
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